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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Former Detroit Mayor’s Attempt to Cover-Up the Murder of 
Tamara Green Foiled by Open Records Request 
Former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick had a rocky history of getting
his hand stuck in the cookie jar.  In his six years as the mayor of America’s 
fourteenth largest metro, Kilpatrick was almost constantly embroiled in 
scandal.  First, his wife assaulted a stripper known as “Strawberry” at a 
party in the state-owned mayor’s mansion.1  Strawberry was murdered 
one year later with a .40 caliber Glock pistol, the same type of weapon 
issued to officers of the Detroit Police Department.2  Then, Kilpatrick
1. See Former Clerk: I Saw Stripper’s Police Report of Manoogian Assault, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Mar. 11, 2008), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20080311/
SUB/244527761/former-clerk-i-saw-strippers-police-report-of-manoogian-assault [https:// 
perma.cc/8BHY-TTMN].  Debate still exists as to whether this party happened or is merely 
urban legend: state officials alleged to have attended the party are adamant the ordeal was 
made up, but the dancers feel differently.  See id.  For the account of one dancer, Tamika 
Ruffin, Stripper Says She Danced at Manoogian Mansion, Saw Carlita Kilpatrick 
Assault Tamara Greene, MLIVE (Nov. 22, 2010), https://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/
2010/11/stripper_says_she_danced_at_de.html [https://perma.cc/K3VX-VQXF].  Retired
Detroit Fire EMS Lieutenant Michael Kearns claims to have responded to the call of the 
assault of one “Tammy Green,” who told Kearns she danced at the mansion.  For the 
account of Michael Kearns, see Elisha Anderson, Unsolved Slaying of Stripper Tamara 
Green Gets National Audience in Podcast, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 7, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2019/02/07/tamara-greene-
crimetown-podcast-detroit/2789295002/ [https://perma.cc/TDP5-DHYA].
2. Episode Fifteen: The Murder of Tamara Greene, CRIMETOWN (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.crimetownshow.com/transcripts-detroit-2/2019/2/4/episode-fifteen-the-murder-
of-tamara-greene [https://perma.cc/W5PU-HC9D]. Some of these records were destroyed. 
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stood trial for his role in the cover-up of Strawberry’s murder.3  Former
Deputy Police Chief Gary Brown and Kilpatrick’s personal bodyguard 
Harold Nelthrope brought a civil whistleblower suit against Kilpatrick, 
alleging they were fired for probing into the mayor’s personal life to 
investigate Strawberry’s murder.4  In this trial, Kilpatrick and his Chief of 
Staff, Christine Beatty, testified under oath that they were not involved in 
an extramarital affair and denied firing Gary Brown for any improper 
reason.5  The jury nonetheless found for Brown and Nelthrope, awarding 
them $6.5 million dollars in damages.6  Kilpatrick took to the steps7 of the
3. See Steven Yaccino, Kwame M. Kilpatrick, Former Detroit Mayor, Sentenced to 
28 Years in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/11/us/former-detroit-mayor-kwame-kilpatrick-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/
Z8CT-Y4LU].
4. See The Chain of Events, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jan. 24, 2008), https://web. 
archive.org/web/20080127115706/http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=%2
F20080124%2FNEWS05%2F801240419 [https://perma.cc/JB63-N384]. Strawberry’s real
name was Tamara Greene.  Episode Fifteen: The Murder of Tamara Greene, supra note 2.  She 
was a twenty-seven-year-old mother at the time of her murder, which remains unsolved.  
Anderson, supra note 1.  Fans of Gimlet’s “Crimetown” podcast may find this profile 
familiar—Tamara Greene’s story was the focus of the podcast’s February 4, 2019 episode.  
See id.; see also Episode Fifteen: The Murder of Tamara Greene, supra note 2.  The specifics 
of the whistleblower case are also discussed on Crimetown’s January 14, 2019 episode.  
See Episode Thirteen: Gary Brown v. Mayor of Detroit, CRIMETOWN (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://www.crimetownshow.com/transcripts-detroit-2/2019/1/14/episode-thirteen-gary-
brown-v-mayor-of-detroit [https://perma.cc/LRY5-JWH4].  Episodes of Crimetown are
accessible via Spotify’s “podcasts” genre page. 
5. The Chain of Events, supra note 4. Kilpatrick and Beatty do admit the termination
may have been “premature,” but are adamant it was not “illegal.”  Id. 
6. Id. 
  7. See Stephen Henderson, Sting of Whispers Hurts Kilpatrick the Most, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Sept. 13, 2007), https://web.archive.org/web/20070916230903/http:/www. 
freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=%2F20070913%2FCOL33%2F709130361&theme
=KILPATRICK082007&imw=Y [https://perma.cc/X4XE-UE22].  Kilpatrick’s anger was
mostly with the jury selection, which was “mostly suburban and, by implication, almost 
all white.”  See id.  Kilpatrick, an African American, believed the allegations against him 
were intended to paint him as “thuggish” and to make his image into a “caricature,” but 
admits his frustrations got the best of him in making his statement.  Id.  He later released 
a statement saying that he respected the judicial system, but felt he was personally attacked 
and painted as a “negative guy.”  Id. 
Although Kilpatrick admits the statement was frustration-driven, data indicates that
racial discrimination in jury selection is still a modern problem, despite the Supreme Court 
attempting to limit the practice.  See, e.g., EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 4 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
L4EY-NW6Y]. As recently as 2010, The Equal Justice Initiative conducted a study of
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City Hall to declare the trial a sham, promising to appeal.8 
Within weeks, Kilpatrick’s view changed.  He swiftly executed a
confidential $8.4 million settlement to avoid further litigation when he 
learned the plaintiffs had obtained evidence that he and Beatty had 
perjured themselves in the trial.9  Kilpatrick settled for $1.9 million over
the jury award to prevent knowledge of his affair from becoming public.10 
The new evidence obtained by the plaintiffs was 682 pages of text 
messages exchanged on city-issued pagers between Kilpatrick and Beatty,
proving their extramarital affair.11  The messages also implicated the pair 
in firing Gary Brown without cause,12 and indicated Kilpatrick had a role 
in choosing the investigator to clear his name.13  The messages further
jury selection in criminal cases in the American South, determining that some state-employed 
prosecutors are trained to eliminate potential jurors based on race, and some persons of 
color in capital cases are tried by an all-white jury. See id.  The Equal Justice Initiative,
like Kilpatrick in his statement from City Hall, argue that this practice undermines the
credibility and reliability of the justice system and must be eliminated. See id.
However, at least one commentator believes Kilpatrick’s tactic has always been to blame 
the white community for his political missteps. “‘During difficult times he has always 
been able to portray his attacks as coming from the white community . . . trying to take 
down the black mayor,’ said Steve Mitchell,” a pollster and previous employee of Kilpatrick.  




The racial conflict complicated public perception of Kilpatrick during the scandal, with 
some individuals believing there was “no clear racial divide” related to the issue, but others 
arguing Kilpatrick’s image harmed a city already enduring difficult times. Id.
 8. See Nick Bunkley, Ex-Officers Ousted by Detroit Mayor Will Get $6.5 Million, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/us/12detroit.html 
[https://perma.cc/UHY7-UNBY].
9. See The Chain of Events, supra note 4; see also Smokey Fontaine, Kwame 
Kilpatrick’s Scandalous Text Messages Revealed, NEWS ONE (Mar. 13, 2009), https:// 
newsone.com/128681/kwame-kilpatricks-scandalous-text-messages-revealed/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7KTG-M7N6].  This source contains sexually explicit messages. 
10. See The Chain of Events, supra note 4.  The settlement agreement also awarded
the plaintiffs their costs in bringing the suit—an unknown, but likely significant, amount.  
See id.
 11. See Fontaine, supra note 9.
 12. Id. 
13. See Excerpts of Text Messages in Ex-Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick Saga, 
MLIVE (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.mlive.com/news/2009/03/excerpts_of_text_ 
messages_in_e.html [https://perma.cc/SY4B-8VPR].  Kilpatrick discussed his preference
of having Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox perform a separate investigation into the 
alleged Manoogian Mansion party.  See id.  Kilpatrick indicated Cox called him and asked 
“who [he] would rather be cleared by,” either Cox himself or County Prosecutor Mike 
Duggan. Id. 
Mike Duggan would go on to become mayor of Detroit after his stint as county
prosecutor and would find himself in his own scandal during his tenure. See Kat Stafford 
& Joe Guillen, Mayor Mike Duggan Set Her Up to Succeed. That Raises Questions., 
212
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showed Kilpatrick and Beatty’s attempts to justify Brown’s termination 
after-the-fact.14  This new evidence compelled Kilpatrick to swiftly settle 
with Brown and Nelthrope, despite Kilpatrick’s earlier promise to appeal.15 
Documents show that the day after the parties agreed to the settlement,
Kilpatrick had it thrown out and replaced with two separate agreements:
a monetary settlement without any reference to the text messages, and a 
confidentiality agreement intended to prevent the messages from becoming 
public.16 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 7, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.freep.com/in-depth/news/ 
local/michigan/detroit/2019/04/04/mike-duggan-sonia-hassan-detroit/3367208002/ [https://
perma.cc/SV22-54F4]. Duggan allegedly became romantically involved with the director 
of a nonprofit that received “preferential treatment” from the city.  See id.; see also Steve 
Neavling, 3 Top Duggan Officials Schemed to Erase Emails to Hide City’s Ties to a Nonprofit, 
IG Finds, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Oct. 21, 2019, 3:50 PM), https://www.metrotimes.com/
news-hits/archives/2019/10/21/3-top-duggan-officials-schemed-to-erase-emails-to-hide-
citys-ties-to-a-nonprofit-ig-finds [https://perma.cc/L4GF-S2PV].  In response to these 
allegations, Duggan’s chief of staff ordered public employees to delete all emails that 
referenced the nonprofit.  See Neavling, supra. Duggan remains the mayor of Detroit.  Mayor’s 
Office, CITY DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov/government/mayors-office [https://perma.cc/
NTQ4-GB4E].
14. See Fontaine, supra note 9; see also Excerpts of Text Messages in Ex-Detroit
Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick Saga, supra note 13. 
15. See Nick Bunkley, Detroit Mayor Loses Fight Over Secret Papers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/28detroit.html [https://perma.cc/ 
R394-7HNV]. See generally Henderson, supra note 7 (discussing Kilpatrick’s speech on
the steps of City Hall, declaring the trial a sham).
16. For a detailed discussion of the settlement agreement, associated confidentiality 
agreement, and Kilpatrick’s legal fight to keep the messages private, see Bunkley, supra 
note 15.  For the specific provisions contained in the confidentiality agreement, see Corey 
Williams, Kilpatrick Approved Secret Deal, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Feb. 8, 2008, 12:00 
PM), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20080208/SUB/508567984/kilpatrick-approved- 
secret-deal [https://perma.cc/UW36-DJEP].  Lawyers involved maintain that the confidentiality
agreement was a requirement for documents obtained during mediation or settlement talks, 
as the confidentiality facilitated open communication between the parties and their attorneys, 
designed to enhance settlement.  Bunkley, supra note 15. Certain documents involved in 
settlement negotiation are likely protected by the attorney work-product doctrine or 
attorney-client privilege, but documents constituting discoverable evidence between 
parties—such as the text messages at issue in the settlement—fall under neither category.  
See generally Alan Gassman, Anything You Text May Be Held Against You, FORBES (July 
31, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alangassman/2019/07/31/e-mail-
stands-for-evidence-mail/#54bd5c9944bd [https://perma.cc/3SGZ-QZFU]. 
A provision similar to that described by the attorneys involved in negotiating the
settlement exists at the federal level under Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Compromise 
Offers and Negotiations. FED. R. EVID. 408. This “settlement privilege” prohibits the use
of evidence surrounding a settlement in litigation to either prove or disprove settlement-
related facts, or to impeach a prior inconsistent statement. See id. The rule does not keep
 213
















   
 











   
 
      
  
 
    
 
As part of Detroit’s process for a city official to enter into a settlement, 
Kilpatrick was required to obtain the city council’s approval of the settlement.17 
When Kilpatrick sent the agreement to the city council for approval, he
omitted any mention of the separate confidentiality agreement.18  The city
council approved the settlement without knowing the messages even existed.19 
Upon learning about the withheld messages, the settlement “sparked public
outrage,” and the city council began proceedings to remove Kilpatrick from 
office.20 
The Detroit Free Press requested the text messages through the Michigan 
Freedom of Information Act.21  The request demanded the City of Detroit
release all settlement-related documents, ultimately providing powerful 
information to the already-angered public of the mayor’s salacious affair 
and subsequent cover-up to protect his political position.22  Kilpatrick and
Beatty were convicted of obstruction of justice, with Kilpatrick ultimately 
serving four months in prison for this offense.23  Kilpatrick resigned his
settlement documents and discussions private to the public, unrelated to pending litigation.
See id.  This can be accomplished with a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement
itself, such as a non-disclosure agreement (NDA).  See Nicole Einbinder, What Happens 
If Someone Breaks a Non-Disclosure Agreement?, PBS (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/frontline/article/what-happens-if-someone-breaks-a-non-disclosure-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/FX4R-Q8WY]. Signing such an agreement with the government has been 
called “legally questionable.”  Caroline Cournoyer, NDAs and Confidential Settlements 
Shake State Capitols and City Halls, GOVERNING (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.governing.com/ 
topics/mgmt/gov-nda-states-trump-confidential-settlement-employee-cities.html [https://
perma.cc/6EGL-D2CB].
17. See Kevin Krolicki, Detroit’s Mayor Indicted in Sex Scandal, REUTERS (Mar.
24, 2008, 8:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-detroit-mayor/detroits-mayor-
indicted-in-sex-scandal-idUSN2431691120080324 [https://perma.cc/Y9EG-LS3F]. 
18. See id.
19. See id.; see also Martha Neil, Detroit v. Detroit: Law Prof Represents City as 
Council Seeks to Fire Mayor, A.B.A. J. (June 11, 2008, 10:15 PM), https://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/detroit_v_detroit_law_prof_represents_city_as_council_seeks_
to_fire_mayor [https://perma.cc/2VRA-Q36B] (discussing the City of Detroit’s legal 
representation in the civil suit against Kilpatrick).
20. Neil, supra note 19. 
21. John Wisely, Changes to Michigan’s FOIA Drops Cost of Public Records, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Jan. 18, 2015, 12:11 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
2015/01/18/michigan-foia-changes/21928995/ [https://perma.cc/W3D3-2L6R].
22. See Jordan Zappala, With the Power of FOIA, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2008, at 
29, 30. 
23. Detroit Mayor Pleads Guilty to Obstruction, Will Quit, NPR (Sept. 4, 2008, 
11:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94270506 [https://perma.cc/ 
EL7R-Y4DV]. This is not Kilpatrick’s only offense.  He would go on to be sentenced to
twenty-eight years in prison for corruption and financial crimes. Kwame Kilpatrick, Former
Detroit Mayor, Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison for Corruption, CBS (Oct. 10, 2013, 1:24
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/kwame-kilpatrick-former-detroit-mayor-sentenced-to- 
28-years-in-prison-for-corruption/ [https://perma.cc/UX7T-5PTA].  If he serves the whole 
sentence, he will be released in 2041.  Id. 
214
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position as mayor, surrendered his license to practice law, paid $1 million 
in restitution to the City of Detroit, and was barred from running for office 
for five years.24 
The Kilpatrick-Beatty scandal illustrates what happens when a government 
official is able to hide behind a cloak of confidentiality, and what happens 
when a capable reporter presses the government for controversial records 
under a state’s open records law.  But the Detroit Free Press had an uphill
battle: the information sought was initially unavailable due to settlement 
privilege,25 and was ultimately subject to a confidentiality agreement in the 
subsequent settlement.26  The Detroit Free Press then had to sue the City 
of Detroit to determine if a settlement agreement even existed—a lawsuit 
in which the lawyer for Gary Brown, in the previous case, was forced to 
provide his notes regarding the existence of a confidential agreement.27 
The mayor’s advisor still maintained the position that “no secret deals 
exist or have ever existed.”28 
The scandal illustrates a conflict with two pieces of American governance: 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),29 which allows the public access 
24. Detroit Mayor Pleads Guilty to Obstruction, Will Quit, supra note 23; Martha Neil, 
How Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick Struck a Deal in Detroit, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 8, 2008, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how_mayor_kwame_kilpatrick_struck_a_deal
_in_detroit [https://perma.cc/DDZ8-FYTE].
25. See Bunkley, supra note 15. Because the parties were negotiating a settlement 
with the information sought by the Detroit Free Press, the Michigan Freedom of Information 
Act request was initially denied because a settlement had yet to be reached.  See id.  When 
Kilpatrick rejected the initial deal and bifurcated the settlement into two separate agreements, 
the confidentiality provision prevented the settlement from disclosure.  Id.  Litigation
ensued to determine whether withholding the text messages under this confidentiality agreement 
was legitimate, and the Detroit Free Press was ultimately victorious.  Id. 
 26. See id.




29. In this case, Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act was at issue.  See Jim
Schaefer, City Fought for Years to Keep Text Messages a Secret, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(May 30, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/2020/05/30/city-detroit-
fought-keep-kwame-kilpatrick-text-messages-secret/5263884002/ [https://perma.cc/
3VSC-FTNP]. Every state has such an open records law, similar to that codified at the
federal level as the Freedom of Information Act.  See Open Government Guide, REPS. 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/ [https://perma.cc/ 
LZR4-R92A]. For a discussion of state open records laws, as well as the similar protections
that exist in the common law, see Introduction to the Open Government Guide, REPS. 
COMM. FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/introduction-to-the-open-government-
 215










    
     
 





to information to provide oversight to government activity, and confidentiality
clauses in civil settlement agreements, which prevent sensitive and 
incriminating information from becoming public knowledge.30  When the 
two conflict, there is no solution that can satisfy both the openness policy 
behind FOIA and the confidentiality policy behind a settlement agreement 
—they are necessarily polar opposites. As the Detroit Free Press learned, 
oftentimes an open records request fails to disclose that a settlement exists 
at all, frustrating a news organization’s effort to exercise its First Amendment 
rights in reporting on a settlement.31  This Comment aims to address the 
disparity behind these concepts, arguing that in a case of workplace sexual 
misconduct,32 confidentiality must necessarily give way to the policy
behind an open government. 
guide/ [https://perma.cc/9386-KDAC].  Similarly, over 100 other countries have enacted
similar provisions.  See By Country, GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFO. RATING, https://www.rti-
rating.org/country-data/ [https://perma.cc/2WCR-W8AH]. For a discussion of open-records 
laws outside of the United States, see infra note 49. 
30. See infra Section II.B for discussion about confidentiality clauses. 
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the ways certain 
otherwise-disclosable information may be withheld from a valid Freedom of Information 
Act request, see infra Section II.A.2 (discussing exemptions and exclusions to disclosure). 
32.  An important note is that Beatty never made sexual harassment, assault, or any
similar allegations against Kilpatrick as a result of the scandal.  See Detroit Mayor Pleads 
Guilty, supra note 23.  The events of the scandal were portrayed as consensual.  See id.  
The sexual activity—at least what is known through the text messages—occurred in the 
early 2000s, long before the #MeToo movement of the late 2010s.  Id.; see also Gurvinder 
Gill & Imran Rahman-Jones, Me Too Founder Tarana Burke: Movement Is Not Over, 
BBC News (July 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-53269751#:~:text= 
Tarana%20began%20using%20the%20phrase,Harvey%20Weinstein%20of%20sexual%
20assault [https://perma.cc/K37R-4M28]. Society has since come to understand that in
certain situations, a power imbalance may render any sexual relationship inherently 
nonconsensual.  See James Doubek, Of Power, Predators and Innocent Mistakes: The 
Complex Problems of Sexual Harassment, NPR (Nov. 5, 2017, 8:31 AM), https://www.
npr.org/2017/11/05/562182050/power-consent-and-sexual-harassment-in-the-public-eye 
[https://perma.cc/VYJ3-TLGW]. For example, employees, typically women, at the behest
of their bosses, typically men, endure sexual harassment out of fear of retaliation for 
reporting.  See LAUREN P. DALEY, DNIKA J. TRAVIS & EMILY S. SHAFFER, SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
IN THE WORKPLACE: HOW COMPANIES CAN PREPARE, PREVENT, RESPOND, AND TRANSFORM 
THEIR CULTURE 10 (2018), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/sexual 
_harassment_in_the_workplace_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F22Z-FYRW].  A similar pattern 
could be seen with Kilpatrick and Beatty, though no such claim was ever made.  See Doubek, 
supra. 
Another important note is that Kilpatrick is far from the only high-profile politician
abusing his power to prey on vulnerable employees.  For example, 2020 Democratic Presidential 
Candidate Michael Bloomberg, the former mayor of New York City, came under scrutiny 
for settling an undisclosed number of sexual harassment claims by requiring female 
employees of his private business to sign non-disclosure agreements.  See Nick Corasaniti 
& Michael M. Grynbaum, Bloomberg, in Reversal, Says He’ll Release 3 Women from 
Nondisclosure Agreements, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
02/21/us/politics/michael-bloomberg-nda.html [https://perma.cc/CJV5-UQED].  Senator
216
BAUER_58-1_POST_BAUER_PAGES_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/6/2021 4:12 PM    
 















   
  






[VOL. 58:  209, 2021] A Conflict of Two Freedoms 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
This Comment begins by addressing the history and policies behind 
FOIA, which are mirrored in the open records laws of all fifty states.  This 
portion of the Comment concludes that FOIA’s policies are openness and 
transparency in the government, specifically to create an informed electorate.
The Comment next analyzes the scope and history of confidential settlement
agreements in the context of the #MeToo movement. This Comment concludes 
that confidential settlements in workplace sexual misconduct cases can
benefit both the accuser and the accused, but ultimately are aimed to protect 
the accused from additional claims by other potential victims. Then, this 
Comment attempts to reconcile the two laws—is there a way to adhere to
the polices of openness and confidentiality in one, mutually-agreeable solution? 
The Comment analyzes the purpose behind the laws in accordance with a 
government interest analysis format.33  Ultimately, the Comment determines
that in this framework, the confidentiality provisions must necessarily give 
way to a valid FOIA request. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Freedom of Information Act
1. History of the Freedom of Information Act 
The federal Freedom of Information Act was signed into law by President 
Lyndon Johnson on July 4, 1966.34  FOIA’s passage came in response
to President Eisenhower’s firing of thousands of government employees 
suspected to be communists, and a subsequent refusal by the government 
Elizabeth Warren, also a 2020 Democratic Candidate, shot back at Bloomberg’s unwillingness
to release the women from their NDAs. See id.  “Michael Bloomberg needs to do a blanket 
release so that all women who have been muzzled by nondisclosure agreements can step 
up and tell their side of the story in terms of what Michael Bloomberg has done,” Warren
told reporters at Nevada’s February 21, 2020 caucus. Id. Bloomberg’s campaign agreed 
to release three women from their agreements, though many question why Bloomberg
chose this number. See id.
33. This format is the underlying theory behind California’s Choice of Law doctrine 
for tort and contracts disputes, and this author believes the best framework through which 
this nontraditional conflict of laws question can be addressed.  See Sommer v. Gabor, 48 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 243 (1995) (applying and describing the governmental interest approach 
for a choice of law determination). 

















   
  
     
 
 
   
     
 





to release any records from the dismissals.35  Congressman John Moss 
fought for twelve years to pass the then-unpopular bill through Congress, 
believing that the bill fought a denial of a basic right inferred from the 
right to speak freely under the First Amendment to the Constitution.36 
Congressman Moss encountered vigorous opposition, including from the 
executive agencies and President Johnson.37  The President believed the 
press “wanted to bring him down,”38 and steadfastly opposed legislation
designed to give the press more information about his Administration.39 
Knowing he lacked the votes to overrule a Presidential veto, Moss’s 
congressional backer Republican Donald Rumsfeld40 stirred up political
stakes, criticizing President Johnson for refusing to back the bill, and 
convincing Minority Leader Gerald Ford41 and the House Republican 
Committee to support the bill.42  The political pressure became too much 
to bear.  Congress passed the bill, and an apprehensive President Johnson 
signed it into law.43 
2. Scope of the Freedom of Information Act 
In theory, FOIA applies to all executive branch federal agencies, but the 
reality of FOIA’s reach is much narrower. FOIA requires certain government
35. Freedom of Information Act, HIST. (May 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/
topics/1960s/freedom-of-information-act [https://perma.cc/8B8Q-2J39]. 
36. Michael R. Lemov & Nate Jones, John Moss and the Roots of the Freedom of 
Information Act: Worldwide Implications, 24 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 2, 14 (2018).  For an in-
depth analysis of the history and intentions of Congressman Moss and his twelve-year 
battle to enact the Freedom of Information Act, see id. 
 37. See SUZANNE J. PIOTROWSKI, GOVERNMENTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE PATH OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 23–24 (2007). 
38. See Lemov & Jones, supra note 36, at 15. 
39. Id.; see also PIOTROWSKI, supra note 37, at 23 (discussing President Johnson’s 
belief that the Act was a “personal attack”). 
40. Congressman Rumsfeld would go on to work in the Nixon, Ford, and George W. 
Bush Administrations. Donald H. Rumsfeld, OFF. SEC’Y DEF. HIST. OFF., https://history. 
defense.gov/Multimedia/Biographies/Article-View/Article/571280/donald-h-rumsfeld/
[https://perma.cc/R35A-AEQW].  He was the Secretary of Defense under President
George W. Bush—and briefly at the end of President Ford’s Administration—and took a 
decidedly different stance on open records during that time.  Id. 
41. House Minority Leader Gerald Ford would go on to be appointed as the fortieth 
Vice President of the United States after the resignation of Spiro Agnew, and to become 
the thirty-eighth President of the United States at the resignation of President Richard 
Nixon, being the only person to serve as both Vice President and President without being 
elected to either position.  Gerald R Ford, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 21, 2009, 1:54 AM), https:// 
www.independent.co.uk/news/presidents/gerald-r-ford-1451818.html [https://perma.cc/
CV4C-5KCK].
42.  Lemov & Jones, supra note 36, at 17. 
43. See id. at 30.  To say the least—Johnson’s own Press Secretary said, “LBJ had 
to be dragged kicking and screaming to the signing ceremony.”  Id. 
218
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agencies to produce documents in their possession upon receipt of a valid 
request,44 and to make certain documents available to all by publication in 
the Federal Register.45  The 1966 Legislature’s purpose in passing FOIA 
was to “clarify and protect the right of the public to information.”46  The
goals behind FOIA are to promote the timely identification of problems 
within the government, allowing the public to demand a response from 
Congress, and ultimately, vote as an informed electorate.47  By its text, 
FOIA only applies to executive branch governmental agencies; the Act defines 
“agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States, 
whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency.”48  It
further expressly excludes Congress and the courts of the United States 
from its scope.49  Notably, FOIA is interpreted to exclude government 
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).  A request is valid if it “reasonably describes 
such records [sought]” and is “made in accordance with published rules.”  Id. 
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).  Government agencies are required to make procedural 
information regarding Freedom of Information Act requests available through the Federal 
Register.  Id. Agencies must also publish the basis for their rulemaking authority in the 
Federal Register. OFF. OF THE FED. REG., A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2, 4–5 
(2011), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZYV2-LEHS]. 
46. S. REP. NO. 88-1219, at 1 (1964). 
47. See generally Freedom of Information Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.
foia.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ANL9-QUZ6] (“The basic function of [FOIA] is to ensure informed 
citizens, vital to the functioning of a democratic society.”). 
48. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).  For an in-depth analysis of the issues in determining “agency”
status, see infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
49. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)–(B).  The exclusion of the legislative branch is a notable 
difference between FOIA and similar laws of other nations.  Over 100 countries have 
implemented a similar protection, but generally these laws apply to all branches of 
government, rather than just the executive.  See By Country, supra note 29.  For example, 
Canada’s Access to Information Act allows access to all federal records, Canada, GLOBAL 
RIGHT TO INFO. RATING, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/Canada/ [https://perma.cc/
C4M3-JEKJ]; the United Kingdom’s Freedom of Information Act covers all records of
public authorities—with a specific carve-out for Scotland, governed by a separate law, 
United Kingdom, GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFO. RATING, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-
data/United%20Kingdom/ [https://perma.cc/VU9X-PFU7]; perhaps France’s Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen’s 1978 application most closely mirrors the United 
States’ FOIA, allowing citizens to demand a copy of any administrative document, see France, 
GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFO. RATING, https://www.rti-rating.org/country-data/France/ [https:// 
perma.cc/BWR2-ZRJT]. For an interactive map discussing the open records laws of
different countries, see The RTI Rating, GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFO. RATING, https://www.rti-
rating.org/ [https://perma.cc/3XZJ-DDRK].
The global RTI (right to information) Rating system utilizes sixty-one different indicators in
assessing the relative strength of a country’s open records framework and has implemented 
a scale from 0–150.  Id.  Several trends are interesting to note: primarily, western European 
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contractors, including those who conduct business directly with an 
agency.50 
Since its passage, FOIA has increased transparency surrounding government 
actions. However, the subject matter to which FOIA applies is nearly as
restrictive as the government agencies within its scope.51 FOIA has nine
exemptions, all of which create categories of records exempt from disclosure 
by the government, even when faced with a legitimate request.  The categories
exempt (1) properly classified matter related to national security and pursuant 
to a valid executive order; (2) matters related solely to the internal personnel 
rules and practices of an agency; (3) matters specifically exempted from 
disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets, commercial matters, or financial 
matters obtained from a person who remains privileged or confidential; 
(5) intra- or inter-agency memorandums and letters that would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; 
(6) personal information that would clearly constitute an unwarranted
invasion of privacy; (7) various law enforcement matters where disclosure 
nations generally score quite poorly in the RTI system, even though, as discussed, their
records laws encompass more branches of the government than those of the United 
States—though it is worth noting that the United Kingdom did still outperform the United 
States. See By Country, supra note 29.  Second, the analysis notes that all but one of the
top twenty-five scoring countries enacted their open records law in the last twenty years,
suggesting that the quality of open records laws has been increasing over time. The RTI
Rating, supra. 
50. See PIOTROWSKI, supra note 37, at 75, 84. 
51.  FOIA’s nine exemptions and three exclusions, discussed infra note 53, prevent 
disclosure of broad categories of records otherwise available under FOIA.  The definition 
of what qualifies as an “agency” under FOIA is likewise restrictive, and has been held to 
exclude, for example: advisory bodies, see Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisers, 762 
F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985); certain Justice Department entities, see Ramirez v. 
Dep’t of Just., 594 F. Supp. 2d 58, 61–62 (D.D.C. 2009); and the Office of the President, 
see Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Archivist of the U.S., 909 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
Further, courts have held that what qualifies as an “agency” for purposes of FOIA must
be determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank of the S.F. 
Med. Soc’y. v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 640 F.2d 1051, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that the defining characteristics of an “agency” are that the agency is a part of government 
“generally independent in the exercise of its functions and which by law has authority to
take final and binding action affecting the rights and obligations of individuals,”  but still
that the determination of what qualifies as an “agency” is a matter to be determined by the
courts on a case by case basis (quoting Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 795
(D.D.C. 1975), aff’d, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976))). This further complicates the FOIA 
process—in Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, the plaintiff sought disclosure of the Red Cross’s 
financial records under FOIA, claiming it was an agency required to produce such records.  
Id. at 1051–52.  The Red Cross claimed it was not an agency under FOIA’s definition, 
forcing the parties to litigate this issue before the validity of the FOIA request could even 
be determined.  Id. at 1052.  As a result, when there is an underlying dispute about the 
status of a particular entity as an agency, a preliminary determination by a court is necessary to 
determine whether FOIA applies at all.  See id. 
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could threaten the ongoing investigation or proceedings; (8) reports related to
financial institutions; and (9) certain geological information and data.52 
In addition to the nine exemptions, a 1986 amendment added three 
exclusions permitting the government to withhold otherwise disclosable 
records.53  The three exclusions permit the government to withhold information
related to (1) a pending criminal investigation, in certain situations; (2)
unacknowledged, confidential information; and (3) classified foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence, or international terrorism records, held 
by the FBI.54 
Additionally, FOIA has been amended several other times.55  The
controversial 1974 Privacy Act amendments gave citizens the right to see 
records about themselves and amend those records if they are inaccurate 
or incomplete.56  The Privacy Act also gave individuals a right to sue the
government if an unauthorized individual accessed their personal records.57 
A 1976 amendment expanded exemption three of FOIA to allow the 
government to withhold information in a broad range of national security
52.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b). 
53. See Implementing FOIA’s Statutory Exclusion Provisions, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-guidance-6 [http://perma.cc/SZ6M-SWNG]. The 
main difference between “exemptions” and “exclusions” is that in the case of exclusions, 
even public acknowledgement of the existence of the records could theoretically result in 
harm to law enforcement or national security.  See id.  Even when faced with a legitimate 
request that would otherwise uncover the records in this category, the government is 
permitted to act as if they do not exist at all.  For an in-depth discussion of the specific 
exclusions and their application, see id. 
The Department of Justice—the agency likely in possession of most documents in the 
“exclusion” categories—indicates that while these exclusions are encountered in FOIA 
requests, the frequency with which they are used is very low: an exclusion came up in only 
123 requests, or 0.18% of all requests processed by the Department of Justice in fiscal year 
2013. Responding to Requests, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/open/ 
responding-requests [https://perma.cc/4RG5-BU2H].
54. Implementing FOIA’s Statutory Exclusion Provisions, supra note 53. 
55. See id. 
56. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d).  Codified as 5 U.S.C. § 552a, the Privacy Act further
requires that agencies may maintain “only such information about an individual as is 
relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency required to be accomplished 
by statute or by executive order.”  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1).  Under the Privacy Act, agencies 
are not free to compile personal information without any express authority to do so.  5 
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(A). 
57.  § 552a(b). 
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situations.58  The Act was limited by executive order in 1982,59 expanded
in the late 1990s,60 made electronic by 1996,61 again limited post-9/11,62 
re-defined in 2007’s OPEN Government Act,63 and finally given additional 
exemptions related to financial institutions in 2010, although this act was 
repealed two months later.64 
Despite its numerous exemptions, exclusions, and amendments, FOIA
has been the primary vehicle through which the public became aware of a 
broad range of high-profile government scandals.65  FOIA requests have 
shed light on the FBI’s surveillance of African American writers, the 
EPA’s knowledge that paper mills were polluting waterways with toxins, 
66 and the government’s wasteful spending in response to Hurricane Katrina.
FOIA requests have also led to substantial government spending in legal 
costs, notably related to defending against an Iran-Contra related FOIA 
challenge.67 
58. See Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241, 1247
(1976) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), the third exemption of FOIA). 
59. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1983). 
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1996) (changing classification system 
for national security information); Exec. Order No. 12,968, 3 C.F.R. 391 (1996), reprinted 
in 50 U.S.C. § 3161 (changing access to classified information); Exec. Order No. 13,142, 
3 C.F.R. 236 (2000) (amending Executive Order 12,958).  This was accomplished through 
numerous executive orders from President Clinton. 
61. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (codified as amended in various sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
62. See Exec. Order No. 13,233, 3 C.F.R. 815 (2002) (restricting access to records 
of former Presidents; revoked 2009); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2383 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (amending 
5 U.S.C. §552(a)(3) to exclude “intelligence community agencies” from requirement to 
disclose information to foreign governments). 
63. See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524
(2007) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552) (defining “a representative of the 
news media,” determining the payment of attorney’s fees, prohibiting assessment of fees 
for an agency that does not comply with FOIA deadlines, and establishing an Office of 
Government Information Services (“OGIS”) to review agency compliance with FOIA). 
64. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
65. See generally Freedom of Information Act, supra note 35. For an interesting
read of less high-profile, but more eccentric records obtained from FOIA requests—including 
the FBI’s “Twitter slang dictionary” and the recipe for White House Honey Ale—see 
Adam D’Arpino, 10 Ridiculous Documents Released via the Freedom of Information Act, 
MENTAL FLOSS (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/58674/10-ridiculous-
documents-released-through-freedom-information-act [https://perma.cc/N9DA-C6FH].
66. See Freedom of Information Act, supra note 35. 
67. See Scott Armstrong, The War Over Secrecy: Democracy’s Most Important
Low-Intensity Conflict, in  A CULTURE OF SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE 
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW 140, 143 (Athan G. Theoharis ed., 1998).  In the Iran-Contra 
case, the Reagan Administration secretly sold arms to Iran and used the proceeds to fund 
the Contras in Nicaragua.  See id.  Congressional investigations and indictments ensued, 
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3. Policy Behind the Freedom of Information Act
The United States has only recognized the right to information under 
FOIA for fifty-three years, but the concept far predates its enactment.68 
Founding Father James Madison—considered the “philosophical founder” of
FOIA—was notoriously concerned with the public’s access to knowledge.69 
Madison argued: “[A] popular government without popular information . . . is
but a [p]rologue to a [f]arce or a [t]ragedy . . . . Knowledge will forever 
govern ignorance . . . .”70  Madison’s statement reflects a societal concern 
at the time of the founding—that a lack of access to information would be 
disastrous for successful governance.71  Echoing Madison’s concerns, the 
American public now regards unfettered access to information as a 
cornerstone of American governance: along with the national government, 
every single state has enacted some kind of open records act,72 and the
Department of Justice itself has stressed the importance of agency 
compliance with FOIA as requests continue to rise.73 
and through multiple subsequent Administrations, FOIA requests to obtain certain records 
were stymied. See id. at 143–54.  The government was ultimately victorious, but the FOIA 
litigation cost the government over four million dollars, which was estimated to be over 
nine million dollars when adjusted to the market rate value of the government lawyers’ services.
See id. at 159.  This case also illustrates how FOIA requests can become an adversarial activity.
The Iran-Contra court case related to the FOIA request is Armstrong v. Executive Office
of the President. 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  However, the greater Iran-Contra scandal 
involved many complex parts, including congressional investigations, indictments, Presidential 
pardons, and so forth.  For a compilation of documents released during the course of the 
congressional investigations, see The Iran-Contra Affair 30 Years Later: A Milestone 
in Post-Truth Politics, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (Nov. 25, 2016), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
briefing-book/iran/2016-11-25/iran-contra-affair-30-years-later-milestone-post-truth-politics 
[https://perma.cc/554H-W37W].




 70. FOIA Post (2008): Celebrating James Madison and the Freedom of Information 
Act, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (Mar. 13, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-post-2008-
celebrating-james-madison-and-freedom-information-act [https://perma.cc/E3TZ-BANQ].
71. See id.
 72. Laura Danielson, Giving Teeth to the Watchdog: Optimizing Open Records
Appeals Processes to Facilitate the Media’s Use of FOIA Laws, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
981, 987 (2012). 
73. See DOJ Stresses Importance of FOIA and Open Government Through

















   
     
 
  
     
 
  





FOIA aims to promote openness in government and also serves as a tool 
for agency accountability to this goal.74  Openness in government has 
obvious implications for an electorate, as Madison envisioned, but FOIA 
also helps consumers, property owners, reporters, teachers, and other everyday 
citizens find information helpful to their particular interest.75  The movement 
promoting the importance of open government has even created an 
awareness movement—called Sunshine Week—occurring every year in 
March to promote the ideals and benefits of open government.76  FOIA
helps the public and private citizens uncover important information, ranging 
from the mundane details related to an individual’s hobby or property, all 
the way to global political scandals, all since the relatively short time since 
the United States first recognized the right to freedom of information.77 
4. Making a Valid Freedom of Information Act Request
The procedures in place for making and responding to a FOIA request
aim to make the process a speedy one, but this is often far from the reality. 
One benefit of FOIA is that any individual can make a FOIA request.78 
No specific showing of “need” or “relevance” to some underlying question 
79 80 or issue must be made.   The requester need not even be an American citizen.
A valid request only “reasonably describes such records [sought]” and is 
“made in accordance with published rules.”81  “Published rules” refers to 
each agency’s rules and procedures for filing a request,82 which must be
74. See id.
75. For a list of common themes of open government activities, see, for example, 
Idea Bank, SUNSHINE WEEK, http://sunshineweek.org/sw13-idea-bank/ [https://perma.cc/
3LJG-R368].
76. See Sunshine (Week) Spring: It’s Your Right to Know, SUNSHINE WEEK, http://
sunshineweek.org/ [https://perma.cc/8RJA-XV9U].
77. See supra Section II.A.2.
78. Frequently Asked Questions, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html [https://
perma.cc/6XB8-YZH5] (answering that anyone can make a request). 
79. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). 
80. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 78. 
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the requirements of a FOIA request. 
82.  § 552(a)(1)(A).  These requirements differ depending on the agency from which 
the information is sought.  For instance, the Department of Energy has a centralized “E-
FOIA” request form, see DOE Headquarters FOIA Request Form, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, 
https://www.energy.gov/doe-headquarters-foia-request-form [https://perma.cc/S2F5-4NMQ], 
whereas the Department of Justice suggests sending requests to the specific “component”
of the agency likely to have possession of the records sought.  See Make a FOIA Request 
to DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/oip/make-foia-request-doj [https://
perma.cc/4CZ2-JYD8]. 
The specific agencies are free to enact a particular system through which FOIA requests 
are processed, so long as the overall system complies with the goals of the government in
224
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published in the Federal Register.83  This system has been streamlined, so
a requester need not hunt down the appropriate agency on his or her own, 
but can sort through contacts in a centralized database and continue the 
84 process from there.
In certain ways, FOIA functions similarly to discovery in litigation. 
FOIA is a vehicle through which individuals are able to obtain information 
about a specific topic, including supporting evidence for a claim to bring
against the government.85  FOIA is often considered an “informal”
discovery process, which can be done during the course of litigation, prior 
to litigation, or during a discovery hold period, where applicable.86 
rapidly processing FOIA requests. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 78 (answering
how different agencies will have their own processes).  For a further discussion of changing
FOIA policies over time, see infra Section II.A.2.
The government’s overall policy on FOIA requests, as well as the funding given to
agencies to ensure compliance, often shifts with changing Administrations.  As a result, 
FOIA processing times—and even the amount of information provided in response to a 
FOIA request—vary from Administration to Administration.  See Fact Sheet: New Steps 
Toward Ensuring Openness and Transparency in Government, WHITE HOUSE OFF. PRESS 
SEC’Y (June 30, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/
30/fact-sheet-new-steps-toward-ensuring-openness-and-transparency [https://perma.cc/
27FY-GGPX].  A common talking point amongst politicians running for the nation’s highest 
office is a commitment to “openness” or “transparency,” often measured—at least in part 
—through FOIA compliance.  See The Limits of Transparency and FOIA Under Trump, 
FIRST AMENDMENT WATCH N.Y.U., https://firstamendmentwatch.org/deep-dive/the-limits-
of-transparency-and-foia-under-trump/#tab-news-updates [https://perma.cc/PJV2-A2PT].  
For a research project dedicated to tracking the transparency of new presidential Administrations, 
see id.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).  For further information regarding these publication requirements,
see supra note 45. 
84. For the interactive database of FOIA agency contacts, see Agency Search,
FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/#agency-search [https://perma.cc/5U7C-8YZR] (scroll 
to the bottom of the page for the drop-down index of government agencies). 
85. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery 
Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (1984). 
86. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 78.  The time required to process
a FOIA request varies based on the information sought, the volume of documents required 
to review prior to answering the request, the agency from which the document was requested, 
and other factors.  See id. Realistically, the timeframe for responding to a FOIA request— 
statutorily required to be completed within twenty days, but often not accomplished that 
quickly—potentially can take longer than the whole of the formal discovery process.  
Responding to Requests, supra note 53.  For a discussion of the general timelines of processing 
FOIA requests, see infra note 93. 
In the civil discovery context, certain jurisdictions impose a “hold period” during which
no formal discovery may take place.  For instance, in California most discovery propounded by
the plaintiff is stalled for ten days after service of the summons and complaint on the
 225
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However, as exemption five notes, “intra- or inter-agency memorandums 
and letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the agency” are not subject to disclosure under 
FOIA.87  This potentially frustrates the discovery-like aspect of FOIA, as
certain records available during litigation are exempt from disclosure 
under FOIA.88 
Once a request is filed with an agency, the agency has twenty days from
the day it receives the request to either accept or deny the request.89  The
agency may take extra time to process requests requiring more 
information from the requester,90 or requests that encounter “unusual 
circumstances.”91  As a practical matter, agencies often do not meet their 
responsive deadlines.92  In 2010, the median response time for a
“complex” request was 228 days—nearly eight months, and over ten 
times the statutorily defined amount.93  When the requester is a news 
defendant, or until the defendant’s first appearance in the action.  Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 2030.020; see also Noah Schwinghamer, Civil Law Time Limits, NOAH SCHWINGHAMER, 
ESQ., http://www.nfsesq.com/resources/timelimits/ [https://perma.cc/59FS-D7JF] (discussing 
discovery timelines in California).  This only places a hold on formal discovery, and as
such, does not ban FOIA requests.  As a result, in an action involving an agency defendant, the
plaintiff may get a head start on discovery against the defendant by making a FOIA request, 
well before the defendant has even appeared in the action.
87.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). 
88. See id. The potential troublesome scenario that can arise from this exemption
is that an individual may have a legitimate claim against the government and not know it, 
as FOIA exemption five prevents disclosure of certain evidence that a party can only obtain 
through formal discovery.  See Nate Jones, The Next FOIA Fight: The B(5) “Withhold It Because 
You Want To” Exemption, UNREDACTED (Mar. 27, 2014), https://unredacted.com/2014/ 
03/27/the-next-foia-fight-the-b5-withold-it-because-you-want-to-exemption/ [https://perma.cc/
V294-7WEP]. This can either lead to frivolous claims, for which the plaintiff believes he 
or she has a legitimate claim based on evidence that does not exist, or the more problematic
scenario of a plaintiff never knowing he or she has a legitimate claim because the information
sought is only available in formal discovery. See id.
The “B(5) exemption,” as it is commonly called, has been a particular area of concern
for FOIA enthusiasts. See id. The exemption protects drafts of memoranda within the agencies,
leading some agencies to designate years-old documents as “drafts” to escape disclosure
of the document.  See id. The exemption was applied to 12% of all processed FOIA requests 
in fiscal year 2013, leading some commentators to call it the “withhold-it-because-you-
want-to” exemption. Id.
 89. Time Periods Under FOIA, DIGIT. MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/
legal-guide/time-periods-under-foia [https://perma.cc/D95S-S7LF].  The agency need not 
actually deliver the records within the twenty days, but technically must respond with an 
acceptance or denial of the request.  Id. 
90. OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 6(a)(1)(I), 121 Stat. 
2524, 2526 (2007). 
91.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(viii)(II)(aa). 
92. Time Periods Under FIOA, supra note 89. 
93. Josh Israel, State Department FOIA Requests Unanswered Four Long Years
Later, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (July 6, 2011), https://publicintegrity.org/2011/07/ 
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organization94 and timeliness is essential to publishing an important piece 
for public knowledge,95 the information sought is long irrelevant after
06/5123/state-department-foia-requests-unanswered-four-long-years-later [https://perma.cc/ 
LP8G-5MW7].  Several Presidential Administrations have emphasized the efficiency and
openness of the FOIA process as one of their areas of concern.  The Obama Administration 
was notably concerned with increasing transparency, despite FOIA responses under that 
Administration taking much longer than the statutory twenty days.  Id. The Obama
Administration also set a record—at the time—for the most outright denials of requests
and censorships of records, cut 9% of the full-time employees tasked with handling FOIA
requests, and spent $434 million in fiscal year 2014 alone just to process requests.  See 
Ted Bridis, Obama Administration Sets New Record for Withholding FOIA Requests, PBS 
(Mar. 18, 2015, 3:43 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/obama-administration-
sets-new-record-withholding-foia-requests [https://perma.cc/5PN6-L5PX]. This number 
includes $28 million in attorney’s fees spent litigating disputes from denied FOIA requests, 
despite the Administration itself acknowledging that one in three of its denials was legally 
improper.  Id.  For a discussion of presidential campaigns and promises of transparency, see 
supra note 82. 
The Trump Administration also lacks transparency.  During an impromptu speech given 
on May 22, 2019, President Donald Trump declared himself “the most transparent president” 
in U.S. history.  ‘I Don’t Do Cover-Ups’: President Trump During Rose Garden Press 
Conference, CNBC (May 22, 2019, 12:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/05/22/ 
i-dont-do-cover-ups-president-trump-during-rose-garden-press-conference.html [https:// 
perma.cc/73AC-GD2K]. The Trump Administration earns low marks in compulsory
disclosures—of note, the Administration requires White House staffers to sign non-
disclosure agreements, and Donald Trump has not yet released his tax returns despite years 
of pressure for him to do so.  Andrew Restuccia, Trump’s ‘Most Transparent President’ 
Claim Looks Cloudy, POLITICO (May 23, 2019, 6:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/ 
2019/05/23/trumps-transparency-1342875 [https://perma.cc/5KBD-GGBP]. In the formal 
FOIA realm, the Trump Administration also falls behind: within its first year, the Trump
Administration denied or censored more FOIA requests than at any point in the previous 
decade, and FOIA lawsuits increased by 70% compared to the Obama Administration’s
last full year. Id. 
For an in-depth analysis of the philosophical basis behind other recent Administrations’
FOIA approaches, see Woojin Noh, The Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations’ FOIA
Policies: The Presidents’ Influences on FOIA Policies (Oct. 17, 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Florida State University), https://fsu.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fsu:183041/datastream/ 
PDF/download/citation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WCS-8FDG].
94. Oftentimes, the requester is a political group seeking negative stories about its 
opponents.  This common use of FOIA in election cycles has “inundated federal agencies 
with Freedom of Information Act requests” to leverage political gain.  See Sam Stein, 
When It Comes to Political FOIA Requests, the DNC Isn’t the Only Practitioner, 
HUFFPOST (Oct. 28, 2010, 8:11 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/when-it-comes-to-
politica_n_775683 [https://perma.cc/6STK-RDGW].
95. This scenario comes up when a FOIA request is made in anticipation of publishing
an article related to a presidential election: the FBI released a spreadsheet of all requests 
including the word “Trump” in 2016, along with the “open” and “close” dates of these 
files. FOIA Requests Containing the Word Trump, FBI, https://vault.fbi.gov/foia-request-
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waiting eight months, rendering the entire request process ineffective and 
useless.96  Reforming the FOIA process is a common talking point amongst 
politicians, but little to no progress has been made in this area.97 
5. Appealing an Agency’s Handling of a Freedom of  
Information Act Request 
As the Detroit Free Press learned in the Kilpatrick scandal, a denial of 
an open records request is not necessarily the end of the process.  The
reporters for the Detroit Free Press were left in a catch-22: they knew the 
settlement existed,98 but could not prove it without further evidence, and
were denied any ability to obtain such evidence.  Because this case 
involved a state open records request99 rather than the federal equivalent,
the reporters’ only recourse was to sue the City of Detroit, hoping a judge 
would compel the city to release the information.100 
The federal government implemented a system requiring an appeal
through the agency to which the request was directed prior to filing FOIA 
litigation.101  The Freedom of Information Act Appeals Officer is a single
containing-the-word-trump/foia-requests-containing-the-word-trump/view [https://perma.cc/ 
6C5M-UHGS].  It is unclear when the spreadsheet was last updated, but many requests are 
listed as “open,” as late as November 2019. See id.
 96. See Danielson, supra note 72, at 1000–01. 
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing recent Administrations’ 
attempts to increase transparency and the results of these efforts). 
98. See Jim Schaefer & M.L. Elrick, Mayor Lied Under Oath, Text Messages Show, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 30, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/2020/ 
05/30/detroit-mayor-kwame-kilpatrick-lied-under-oath-text-messages-show/5271857002/ 
[https://perma.cc/4A8N-9RF5]. To those involved, it was evident a settlement must exist 
—Kilpatrick was adamant that he would appeal, but suddenly the entire case ended with 
an award greater than the jury–determined amount.  Id.  The Kilpatrick case illustrates how the 
existence of a settlement can be somewhat obvious, even when the settlement itself is 
confidential. 
 99. FOIA Request Was Key in Detroit Mayor’s Legal Saga, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM 
PRESS (Sept. 5, 2008), https://www.rcfp.org/foia-request-was-key-detroit-mayors-legal-
saga/ [https://perma.cc/VS3W-QL6Z].
100. The litigation process was not easy for the Detroit Free Press.  Mayor Kilpatrick 
delayed his deposition and attempted to obtain testimony from the reporters regarding their 
state FOIA request.  Id.  However, the Detroit Free Press was ultimately victorious, and the 
records became public.  See id. 
The reporters who broke the Kilpatrick case, M.L. Elrick and Jim Schaefer, won a
Pulitzer Prize in 2009 for their coverage of the story. The 2009 Pulitzer Prize Winner in
Local Reporting, Detroit Free Press Staff, and Notably Jim Schaefer and M.L. Elrick,
PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/detroit-free-press-staff-and-notably-
jim-schaefer-and-ml-elrick [https://perma.cc/Z4XA-6YZV].  For the specific articles the
reporters authored that led to the award, see id. 
 101. See 43 C.F.R. § 2.57 (2016). 
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individual within each agency who makes decisions on FOIA appeals,102 
and this intra-agency appeals process must be exhausted prior to filing a 
civil suit for enforcement of FOIA.103 This process tacks on additional 
time to the processing of a FOIA request.  The Code of Federal Regulations 
indicates that appeals are processed within a twenty-day time frame from 
the receipt of the appeal,104 which can be made at any point within ninety 
days from the allegedly improper response.105  If the request is time-sensitive, 
this process may add up to twenty days—in addition to the time required 
to prepare the appeal—to the overall waiting time for a final decision. 
After a final agency decision has been reached on the issue, the
individual is free to bring a suit under the FOIA seeking compliance with 
their request.106  Lawsuits filed under FOIA reached a record high in 2018 
and have been on the rise almost every year since 2008.107  A record 
number of lawsuits were left without a decision in 2018, with 1,204 cases 
stalled somewhere along the litigation process.108  The Departments of 
Justice and Homeland Security are the top-sued agencies under FOIA,109 
102. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 2.59(f), 2.60(a) (2016). 
103. 43 C.F.R. § 2.57 (2016).  One loophole exists to this process, codified in 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i): “Any person making a request . . . shall be deemed to have
exhausted his administrative remedies . . . if the agency fails to comply with the applicable 
time limit provisions . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i).  Under this provision, if an agency 
fails to respond within the twenty day timeframe—which may be tolled if the agency 
requires additional information from the requester, see supra note 90 and accompanying 
text, or extended for unusual circumstances, see supra note 91 and accompanying text—
the agency automatically loses jurisdiction over the appeal, and the administrative remedies are 
deemed exhausted.  See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 7, Friends 
of the Earth v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 1:18-cv-02837 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2018), ECF 
No. 1, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/open_government/pdfs/EPA-FOIA-
Complaint-As-Filed-12-4-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR4W-8AY8] (discussing the exhaustion
of administrative remedies through 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i)).  However, if the agency 
can show “exceptional circumstances” warranting the delay and “due diligence” in responding 
to the request, the agency may retain jurisdiction over the appeal.  § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 
104.  43 C.F.R. § 2.58(a)–(b) (2019). 
105.  § 2.62. 
106.  § 2.61(b). 
107. Christine Mehta, Annual Report: FOIA Lawsuits Reach Record Highs in FY 
2018, FOIA PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2018), http://foiaproject.org/2018/11/12/annual-report-
foia-lawsuits-reach-record-highs-in-fy-2018/ [https://perma.cc/W9RM-44YL].
108. Id.
 109. Id. 
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likely because a number of exemptions and exclusions apply only to these
agencies.110 
FOIA is a complex mechanism by which the general public becomes 
aware of the federal government’s activities.  FOIA, however, does not 
ensure every piece of information sought will be disclosed, but absent a 
valid exception or exemption,111 it is presumed disclosable.112  However, 
even outside of the FOIA context, the government has an interest in keeping 
certain things confidential.  The remaining introductory portion of this 
Comment will discuss the use of confidential settlement agreements. 
B. Confidential Settlement Agreements 
1. Commonality of Pre-Trial Resolutions 
According to one commentator, “surprisingly little” information exists 
about how common settlement agreements are in civil litigation.113 The
majority of civil cases settle—or are otherwise disposed of—prior to 
trial.114  Few cases complete the litigation process entirely—according to 
one U.S. Courts report, only 0.8% of cases reached trial in the U.S. District 
Courts in 2018.115  The majority of these cases that do not make it to trial 
still involve some level of court involvement, with most resolved “before 
trial”—200,549 pre-trial resolutions of 290,311 total cases—and another 
large amount resolved “during or after pretrial”—32,073 cases.116  Only
55,246 cases were resolved with no court involvement whatsoever, 
110. For example, exclusion three related to FBI documents can necessarily only 
apply to the Department of Justice; exemption seven related to law enforcement efforts is 
likewise in the exclusive control of the Department of Justice; and documents pursuant to 
exemption one related to national security likely are only found in the Department of 
Homeland Security.  See supra Section II.A.2. 
 111. See generally supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text (discussing FOIA’s
exceptions and exemptions). 
112. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)–(2) (identifying information to be made available to
the public). 
113. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why 
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009). 
114. U.S. CTS., TABLE C-4: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS–CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY 
NATURE OF SUIT AND ACTION TAKEN, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 
31, 2018, at 1 (2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/25824/download [https://perma.cc/ 
R3QF-VUMV] [hereinafter TABLEC-4].  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(2), the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts is required to publish caseload information annually; the Office 
reports this data every six month on the U.S. Courts website.  See Federal Judicial Caseload 
Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics [https://perma.cc/A3HA-NRR3]. The data does not identify
the age of the case, so this information may also include cases not yet ready for trial. 
115. TABLE C-4, supra note 114. 
116. Id.
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comprising only 19% of all cases in the U.S. District Courts in 2018.117 
Many cases resolve prior to trial, but for reasons other than settlement.118 
Settlement agreements are a way to creatively resolve claims without
having to complete the litigation process.119  Confidential settlements are 
not the only specific subset of settlements—parties are free to opt for 
whatever provisions they want, so long as the agreement remains 
enforceable as a valid contract.120  For instance, structured settlements are
a subset of settlements often used when the beneficiary is a minor.  The 
payments in these settlements are made over a long period of time pursuant 
to some agreed upon structure, generally intended to disallow the minor 
from spending the settlement money until he or she is of age.121  The evolving 
contractual nature of the field of settlements suggest how confidentiality became 
a provision on which parties are free to agree in their contracts.122 
117. Id.
118. Covering Civil Cases – Journalist’s Guide, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/covering-civil-cases-journalists-guide [https://perma.cc/JAM5-WR8D].
The data does not differentiate the disposition of the case, but reasonably these cases could 
be disposed of with a dispositive motion; dismissal, whether at the direction of the court 
or the plaintiff simply deciding to drop the case; pre-emption; removal; or any other 
potential method.  Id.  Because each district in the federal judiciary follows its own local 
rules, data collection becomes even more challenging.  Additionally, each judge can enact 
his or her own chamber rules related to settlements.  Judges and Judicial Administration 
– Journalist’s Guide, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judges-and-
judicial-administration-journalists-guide [https://perma.cc/JU7J-QEXH]. Determining the
number of cases resolved due to settlement becomes a difficult task when the timelines for 
doing so are different within each individual district or chamber. 
119. What Does It Mean to Settle a Case?, FINDLAW, https://litigation.findlaw.com/
legal-system/what-does-it-mean-to-settle-a-case.html [https://perma.cc/8HT8-WJDF].
120. Enforceability of a contract is generally governed by state law, so the requirements
for an enforceable contract vary.  Krystyna Blokhina Gilkis, Contract, CORNELL L. SCH., 
L. INFO. INST. (July 2019), https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/contract [https://perma.cc/ 
5BXV-R34Z]. At the federal level, all federal contracts are governed by Title 41 of the 
U.S. Code.  The general requirements for an enforceable contract are (1) mutual assent,
expressed by a valid offer and acceptance; (2) adequate consideration; (3) capacity; and 
(4) legality.  See id.; see also TIMOTHY MURRAY, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: FORMATION 
OF CONTRACTS § 1.19 (rev ed. 2018). 
121. Structured Settlements for Minors, CBC SETTLEMENT FUNDING, https://cbcsettle
mentfunding.com/structured-settlement/minors/ [https://perma.cc/B544-KNUM].
122. See generally JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., 9 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARIES ASSIGNMENT JOINT AND SEVERAL CONTRACTS § 47.9 (rev. ed. 2020) 
(discussing confidentiality, structured settlements, claims against the government, and the 
changing public policy limitations on these situations over time). 
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2. Settlements and Available Contract Remedies 
Confidential agreements also exist outside the settlement context. 
Confidentiality clauses are common in contracts,123 exist as non-disclosure 
agreements,124 and are implied from certain relationships.125  Non-disclosure 
agreements are freestanding confidentiality agreements aimed to prevent 
one or both parties from disclosing certain information.126  These agreements
are common in business settings127 and certain employment situations.128 
Non-disclosure agreements are different from confidentiality provisions 
found in settlements, but aim to accomplish similar goals.129 
123. See Elizabeth Tippett, Non-Disclosure Agreements and the #MeToo Movement, 
DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2019, at 12, 13, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_
resolution/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/2019/winter-2019-me-too/non-
disclosure-agreements-and-the-metoo-movement/ [https://perma.cc/VNV9-W6BD] (discussing
how confidentiality clauses are common in contracts for employees exposed to intellectual 
property, but how confidentiality clauses can often prevent an employee from disclosing 
unlawful conduct in the workplace). 
124. See Richard Harroch, The Key Elements of Non-Disclosure Agreements, FORBES 
(Mar. 10, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/03/10/the-
key-elements-of-non-disclosure-agreements/#7341c1e4627d [https://perma.cc/2VGH-
YTZS] (discussing common components of a non-disclosure agreement). 
125. MURRAY, supra note 120, § 1.19. 
126. See Harroch, supra note 124. 
127. See id.
128. For example, the Trump Administration requires all high-level White House staffers
to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA), which extends to after the Administration’s 
end.  Ruth Marcus, Trump Had Senior Staff Sign Nondisclosure Agreements. They’re Supposed 
to Last Beyond His Presidency, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2018, 12:56 PM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-nondisclosure-agreements-came-with-him-to-the-
white-house/2018/03/18/226f4522-29ee-11e8-b79d-f3d931db7f68_story.html [https://perma.cc/
W9M7-NALR]. These agreements force staffers who ultimately disclose confidential 
information about the President to pay damages for their contractual breach, allegedly in 
the amount of $10 million. Id. The staffers indicate that the agreements are intended
to mirror those signed by employees of Trump Tower prior to Donald Trump’s presidency.  Id.  
Some staffers only signed the agreement because they believed it would be unenforceable, or
after being pressed to do so by former White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus and The 
White House Counsel’s Office.  Id.  Though not yet legally challenged, commentators have 
called the non-disclosure agreements “oppressive,” “constitutionally repugnant,” and “an
outrageous effort to limit and chill speech.” Id.
 129. NDAs are common as addenda to contracts for everything ranging from employment 
agreements to purchases of tech companies.  See Catherine Bragg, Non-Disclosure 
Agreements in Review, A.B.A. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
construction_industry/publications/under_construction/2019/summer/non-disclosure-
agreement/ [https://perma.cc/3DAU-2FVK].  The general premise with an NDA is that certain 
elements—identified in the NDA—are to remain confidential.  Id. Like confidentiality 
clauses, they can bind one, or both parties.  However, a settlement is reached after one 
person makes a claim, and the confidentiality provision is added as part of the resolution 
of that claim.  Id.  An NDA may be used this way, but is used preemptively to keep information 
confidential, unrelated to some sort of claim of misconduct that accompanies a settlement.  
See id.
232
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The contractual nature of a confidential settlement also gives rise to
contractual remedies for a breach of the settlement agreement.130  If a 
party breaks a confidentiality clause, the non-breaching party can bring a 
breach of contract claim against the breaching party and recover damages.131 
When the non-breaching party is an organization, the damages from a
breach of confidentiality could be massive.  If the potential impact of a
company’s unfavorable information going public was significant enough
for the organization to agree to settle the issue, a breach of this agreement
is likely to be very costly.132  Likewise, when a party breaches the
confidentiality clause of the settlement agreement, the non-breaching 
party is entitled to rescission and restitution of the contract.133  The settlement 
agreement can be withdrawn completely, including the financial benefit 
130. See Edmund J. Sikorski, Jr., Breach of Confidentiality Provision Leads to Loss 




 132. See, e.g., James V. Grimaldi & Caroline E. Mayer, Firestone, Ford Settle Tire 
Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
2001/01/09/firestone-ford-settle-tire-lawsuit/2e162ee3-c28f-4231-8f94-520e41b67360/ 
[https://perma.cc/VH6H-NK98]. A prominent controversy in this area arose in the early 
2000’s when Ford partnered with Firestone, a tire manufacturer, to provide tires for its 
Explorer line of SUVs.  See id.  The tires turned out to be defective and caused hundreds 
of accidents in the new Explorers.  See id.  Ford and Firestone settled claims with accident 
victims, including with one woman who received $30 to $45 million, according to sources 
familiar with the agreement.  See id.  The amount and terms of the settlements were not 
disclosed, effectively allowing Ford and Firestone to chill hundreds of claims of products 
liability while the companies attempted to recall and replace the tires.  Id.  The tires caused 
at least 174 deaths and 700 injuries.  John Greenwald, Inside the Ford/Firestone Fight, 
TIME (May 29, 2001), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,128198,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/6FWX-QG5A].
133. But see Higbie v. United States, 778 F.3d 990, 994–95 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  Higbie
analyzes a case where a plaintiff claimed the federal government breached a confidentiality 
agreement, arguing that the government’s use of mediation materials violated the confidentiality 
agreement made during mediation.  See id. at 992.  Plaintiff Higbie won this argument, but 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the agreement itself had provided 
for a remedy for its breach—that the mediation materials used by the government in 
subsequent proceedings must be excluded.  Id. at 994.  Because of this provision, the Court 
did not find monetary damages mandatory under the agreement, as the existence of agreed-
upon non-monetary relief precluded mandating monetary damages.  Id. at 994–95.  The 
dissent by Judge Taranto finds no compelling basis to move away from the “principle long 
understood in contract law: ‘damages are always the default remedy for breach of contract.’”  
Id. at 996 (Taranto, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 885 
(1996) (plurality opinion)). 
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obtained by the breaching party.134 The American Bar Association assesses
the importance of the issue, stating that “confidentiality agreements need 
to be taken seriously and . . . the consequences of violating them can be 
serious.”135  The availability of contractual remedies for a breach of a
settlement agreement give the non-breaching party significant legal recourse, 
and give the parties creative freedom to contract for remedies of their 
136 choice.
When a confidentiality clause is broken, disagreement exists as to 
whether the underlying contract is open for re-evaluation.  If it is, the other 
provisions of the contract may be open to judicial interpretation.137  The
U.S. Supreme Court has not decided whether a breached contract, subsequently 
sued upon, reopens the original claim.138  The lower courts are divided on 
the issue.139  The Ninth Circuit allows the reopening of the original 
claim.140  In contrast, the Sixth Circuit believes doing so is “simply not
supported” by precedent because the litigation on the breach of contract 
claim may be unrelated to the claims in the underlying lawsuit.141 
134. The benefit refers to either the financial reward to the plaintiff in the underlying 
suit, or the defendant’s right not to be sued on the underlying issue, although this is subject 
to a jurisdictional split.  See generally infra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing 
the jurisdictional split). 
135.  Sikorski, Jr., supra note 130. 
136. For an example of contracting around default contractual remedies, see Higbie, 
778 F.3d. at 994–95.  Freedom to contract for specific remedies, as endorsed by the Federal 
Circuit in Higbie, has potential for causing issues when the parties to a contract are not on 
equal footing in drafting the contract.  See id. at 995.  When one party is more sophisticated 
than the other—common in employment contexts—that party is incentivized to incorporate 
remedies for a breach of contract into the contract itself, as the less-sophisticated party 
may not understand the contracted-for remedy as precluding any other remedy.  See id. at 
996 (Taranto, J., dissenting).  This issue was addressed by the dissent in Higbie, which 
expressly discusses case law allowing monetary damages for a breach of confidentiality 
provision in employment contracts, and several other specific contexts.  Id. The employment 
case discussed in the Higbie dissent, Youtie v. Macy’s Retail Holding, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 
2d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2009), is a District court-level case.  See Higbie, 778 F.3d at 996 (Taranto, 
J., dissenting).
137. See Jim Wagstaffe, Enforcing Settlements and Consent Decrees, LEXIS PRAC. 




 140. See Keeling v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 937 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the “frustration” of the purpose of the settlement agreement is sufficient to
constitute an exceptional circumstance under 60(b)(6)).  Under a rescission and restitution
theory, in order to put the non-breacher in the position he or she would have been in had 
the contract never been made, the non-breacher must necessarily regain the right to sue on 
the underlying action, the pivotal bargaining point of the settlement agreement. See id.
141. McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc., 229 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir.
2000) (declining to extend Rule 60(b) to reopen a claim underlying a breach of contract of 
a settlement agreement).  The Sixth Circuit takes the position that the litigation surrounding a 
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The Sixth Circuit case McAlpin v. Lexington 76 Auto Truck Stop, Inc.
also addresses another issue with breach of contract claims arising out of 
breached settlement agreements.142  While a settlement may be obtained under
a federal court claim, the settlement itself is a contract properly litigated 
in state court.143  This distinction leads to confusion in the subsequent breach
of contract claim when the settlement agreement is breached.  Unless the 
parties satisfy diversity jurisdiction,144 or some independent ground exists 
for supplemental jurisdiction,145 the parties will be forced to litigate the
breach of contract claim may simply have nothing to do with the situation surrounding the 
formation of that contract, and the breach may be so minimal that reopening the underlying 
claim is fundamentally unfair. See id.
 142. See id.
143. See id. at 498–99 (holding unless either independent grounds for jurisdiction 
exist or the federal court retains jurisdiction over a settlement, the federal court is a court of 
limited jurisdiction that may not hear disputes of settlements entered into based on federal 
court suits). 
144. See generally 28 U.S.C § 1332. 
145. Likely, supplemental jurisdiction would arise when the original lawsuit
between the two parties would be re-opened under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 
because of the breach of the settlement agreement, and the state law breach of contract 
claim would be a state law claim subject to supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts 
in the subsequent re-litigation of the original—federal—claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).  Supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, and the federal court may 
still choose not to hear the state claim.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).  Finally, lower courts are 
divided on whether to allow the original claim to reopen, as this may not be consistent 
with Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b).  See McAlpin, 229 F.3d at 502–03.  In that case, there would 
be no basis for federal jurisdiction whatsoever—unless the claim meets the diversity 
requirements for 28 U.S.C. § 1332—and thus no federal claim on which to attach a 
supplemental state claim.  See id. at 502; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  The Supreme Court has not 
heard the issue of reopening the underlying claim.  McAlpin, 229 F.3d at 503 (referencing 
the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that while it has not addressed the issue, other 
circuits have). 
This analysis presupposes the contract was made pursuant to state law.  In the vast majority 
of cases, this is appropriate—state law generally governs all contractual formation.  See, 
e.g., Walker v. Builddirect.com Techs., Inc., 349 P.3d 549, 552 (Okla. 2015). However, 
when the federal government enters into a contract, specific federal statutes apply. See, 
e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 3101.  Title 41 of the U.S. Code governs the formation of contracts with 
the federal government.  A breach of contract claim arising under a Title 41 contract 
satisfies federal question jurisdiction and requires no supplemental source of jurisdiction.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); 41 U.S.C. 
§ 7107 (“[A] contractor may appeal the [agency decision regarding a breach of contract 
claim] to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit . . . .”); 41 U.S.C. 
§ 7102 (“Unless otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, this chapter applies to any 
express or implied contract . . . made by an executive agency . . . .”); see, e.g., PIOTROWSKI, 
supra note 37 (discussing the role of federal contractors in FOIA). 
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breach of contract claim in state court.146 McAlpin stands for the proposition
that an independent basis for federal jurisdiction is required, as the 
underlying case is not subject to reopening under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b).147 Thus, the federal judiciary’s involvement in contractual 
disputes is necessarily limited to the few categories of contracts arising 
under federal law, those with diversity jurisdiction, or the limited circumstances 
in which a court exercises discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over a 
state-law claim. 
3. Policy Considerations Behind Confidential Settlements 
Confidentiality arose as a natural extension of the freedom to contract.
Confidentiality benefits defendants that are especially concerned with 
continued business aspects of the settlement.148  For instance, large corporations
frequently use confidential settlement agreements to settle workplace
harassment claims or products liability actions.149  The confidentiality 
provision in these types of settlements allows the corporation to pay the 
injured plaintiff’s damages in return for the plaintiff’s promised silence 
on the issue of the corporation’s liability.150  This keeps other would-be
plaintiffs in the dark on their potential claims, and in the long run, could 
save the defendant corporation a great deal of money.151  The settlement
is likely to be overvalued due to the confidentiality requirement, but the 
146. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367; supra note 145. 
147. McAlpin, 229 F.3d at 503; see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
148. See Bradford J. Kelley & Chase J. Edwards, #MeToo, Confidentiality Agreements, 
and Sexual Harassment Claims, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 17, 2018), https://businesslawtoday.org/ 
2018/10/metoo-confidentiality-agreements-sexual-harassment-claims/ [https://perma.cc/
SCY2-UYH4].
149. See id.; see also Kevin M. McDonald, Separations, Blow-Outs, and Fallout: A 
Treadise on the Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-Firestone Tire Recall, 37 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2004) (discussing the number of settlements of claims arising out of
the Ford-Firestone products liability controversy). 
150. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 149, at 1078. 
151. If the stand-by plaintiffs fail to bring their claim because of the settlement, the 
defendant corporation is incentivized to pay the plaintiff more in the settlement to swiftly 
execute the confidential agreement to prevent information about the claim reaching the 
stand-by plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing 
Settlements and Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 556–57 (2008).  The faster the 
defendant is able to confidentially settle the plaintiff’s claims, the less likely it is that the 
stand-by plaintiffs will learn of the plaintiff’s claims and recognize their own right to 
compensation.  See generally Ronald L. Burdge, Confidentiality in Settlement Agreements 
is Bad for Clients, Bad for Lawyers, Bad for Justice, A.B.A. (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012priv
acyandconfidentiality/confidentiality_settlement_agreements_is_bad_clients_lawyers_
justice/ [https://perma.cc/7SX7-KEF4] (arguing that confidentiality clauses protect the public
from important information). 
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confidentiality could prevent many other claims from seeing the light of 
day.152  Similarly, corporations place extreme value in their reputations,
and confidentiality provisions can provide security that their reputation 
will not be negatively impacted by the litigation.153 
However, the parties are not free to contract for anything they want.  A 
confidentiality provision in a settlement agreement is never absolute, and 
can only accomplish one of two things: either the parties are not allowed
to talk about the settlement itself, or the parties agree to seal the entire 
record—including discovery, pleadings, and so forth.154  The first option
allows for some creativity—confidentiality provisions can simply require 
the amount of the settlement to remain secret, or can require all terms to 
be confidential, or anything within this spectrum.  Settlements and 
confidentiality agreements must also follow the regular rules of contract 
formation, and confidentiality agreements often conflict with the requirement 
that a contract may not be contrary to public policy.155  When a contract 
152. See Grimaldi & Mayer, supra note 132 (discussing the Ford-Firestone controversy
that lead to large payments for plaintiffs in an attempt to chill subsequent claims); see also 
Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements [https://
perma.cc/D88Q-F3R2] (discussing how Harvey Weinstein’s confidential settlements with 
victims of his sexual misconduct prevented other victims from bringing their claims). 
153. See Kelley & Edwards, supra note 148. 
154. Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information 
About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 677 (2001). 
155. A modern debate as to the enforceability of a confidentiality agreement arguably
contrary to public policy has come to the public’s attention with the Donald Trump-
Stephanie Clifford non-disclosure agreement scandal.  In that agreement, Clifford, an adult 
actress, allegedly engaged in a sexual relationship with President Donald Trump prior to 
his election.  See Wilson R. Huhn, The Trump/Clifford Non-Disclosure Agreement: Violation 
of Public Policy and the First Amendment, JURIS MAG. (May 13, 2018), http://sites.law. 
duq.edu/juris/2018/05/13/the-trump-clifford-non-disclosure-agreement-violation-of-public-
policy-and-the-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/9LTW-UYBF].  In 2016, before President
Trump took office, his personal attorney Michael Cohen negotiated a non-disclosure agreement 
with Clifford.  Id.  Clifford was prohibited from disclosing any information about the alleged 
affair with Trump.  Id.  She received $130,000 in exchange for signing the agreement.  Id.  
Many commentators refer to this payout as “hush money.”  See, e.g., id. 
Clifford would later claim the agreement was unenforceable and attempt to be released 
from the agreement, enabling her to discuss the affair. See Michael Finnegan, Stormy Daniels’
Lawsuit Against Trump Is Dismissed by Judge, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:48 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-stormy-daniels-trump-lawsuit-dismissed-
20180307-story.html [https://perma.cc/97PA-LWBE]. She filed three lawsuits against
Trump and Cohen, arguing that the agreement was invalid, that she had been defamed, and 
that her personal attorney colluded with Trump and Cohen and acted against her interests.  
Id. Clifford’s first lawsuit, related to the validity of the contract, was dismissed after 
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is held to violate public policy, courts may not enforce the provisions
of the contract.156 
While confidentiality has clear benefits for defendants, it can also benefit
the individual plaintiff.  If the representation on the plaintiff’s behalf is 
aware of the policy surrounding confidentiality, the lawyer may push for 
a larger settlement amount in return for their client’s confidentiality on 
the defendant’s liability.157  Even the dollar amount of the settlement can 
be confidential, requiring defendants to pay large sums of money without 
public awareness.158 This benefits plaintiffs by ensuring the general public is
not privy to their specific financial situation. 
Confidentiality also discourages “stand-by” plaintiffs.  Stand-by plaintiffs
are individuals who wait and see what the outcome of their claim would 
be until they see the outcome of pending litigation against the same 
defendant.159  If these stand-by plaintiffs are unable to watch from the
sidelines, it is possible they will either be encouraged to bring their suit in 
Trump and Cohen agreed to release Daniels from the agreement, rendering the lawsuit 
moot. Id. The court did not reach the issue of whether the agreement was enforceable or 
invalid as contrary to public policy.  Id.  Eventually, Cohen would be sentenced to jail time 
for campaign finance violations related to his role in using Trump’s campaign funds to 
pay the $130,000 to Clifford.  See Kara Scannell & Gloria Borger, Michael Cohen’s Life 
Behind Bars, CNN (June 7, 2019, 7:35 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/06/politics/
michael-cohen-jail-otisville/index.html [https://perma.cc/H2CM-425D].  Beginning in the 
spring of 2017, Cohen began serving his three-year sentence. Id. According to one article, 
prison is treating Cohen very well and he is “more relaxed than he has ever been.”  Id. 
 156. See, e.g., Saltzman v. Thomas Jefferson Hospitals, Inc., 166 A.3d 465, 475 (Pa. 
2017).  The contract may include a “severability clause,” which provides that when one 
portion of a contract is found unenforceable, that portion is “severed” from the larger agreement, 
and the remaining agreement remains enforceable.  See, e.g., Penberthy v. AT&T Wireless 
Servs., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (discussing the enforceability 
of separate provisions in a contract that contains a severability clause). 
157. See Stacy Perman, #MeToo Law Restricts Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in 
Sexual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-nda-hollywood-20181231-story.html [https://perma.cc/YU55-
GRHB] (discussing the bargaining imbalance that may hinder bargaining for plaintiffs and 
how some advocates believe a ban on confidential settlements may make it more difficult 
for victims to obtain settlements).
158.  Both parties can request that the amount remain confidential.  See id. 
159. The rules of joinder and preclusion prohibit this practice to a certain extent, but 
unless the stand-by plaintiff was “adequately represented” in the initial action, the second 
action is usually valid.  See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 896–98 (2008).  Only six situations 
exist in which a party can be bound by an earlier action in the res judicata context, all of 
which require some element of privity or representation of the second plaintiff in the initial 
action. Id. at 893–95.  The federal rules of joinder only mandate joinder of a new plaintiff 
in situations where the court “cannot accord complete relief among existing parties” or 
disposing of the action without the additional plaintiff would either result in an inconsistent 
obligation to an existing party or impair the ability of the additional plaintiff in protecting 
his or her interests.  FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
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a timely manner, or not bring their suit at all.160  This can be a driving 
force behind defendants pushing for confidentiality in their settlement 
agreements. Generally, the provision requiring confidentiality aims to 
avoid additional lawsuits on the same matter, a situation inherent in cases 
where stand-by plaintiffs are waiting to see if bringing their claims will 
be lucrative.161 
4. Confidentiality in Workplace Sexual Misconduct Cases 
The issue of confidentiality in settlements for sexual tort cases is 
complex, particularly those occurring in the workplace.  These issues 
range anywhere from an “accidental” brushing against a person’s body162 
160. In the Harvey Weinstein scandal, the “chilling” effect confidentiality has on 
additional plaintiffs coming forward is a common call for a changed policy with regards 
to confidential settlements.  See Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded, 
BBC NEWS (May 29, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672
[https://perma.cc/N4E5-MPT7].  Because Weinstein settled disputes confidentially, the 
hundreds—if not more—of women with claims of sexual misconduct against Weinstein 
all believed they were the only ones with such a claim.  Id. When faced with a Hollywood 
mogul with significant industry power, bringing a claim as a lone claimant is a high-risk 
situation for plaintiffs, especially those looking to work in the industry.  Id. 
 161. See, e.g., Harvey Weinstein Timeline, supra note 160 (an example of a widespread
misconduct within an organization in which additional individuals made allegations over 
a period of time). 
162. A common story with ex-Senator, ex-Vice President, and 2020 Presidential 
hopeful Joe Biden has been his “too-long hugs” and “brushing” up against female staffers.  
See Lissandra Villa & Charlotte Alter, What We Know About Tara Reade’s Allegation that 
Joe Biden Sexually Assaulted Her, TIME (May 2, 2020, 8:55 PM), https://time.com/5831100/
joe-biden-tara-reade-allegation/ [https://perma.cc/VZ2R-UA7G].  In the #MeToo era, at
least seventeen women have come out with allegations of this sort against Biden—one of 
whom, Tara Reade, alleges that Biden sexually assaulted her by digitally penetrating her 
while she worked for him in the Senate in 1993.  Id.  Biden vehemently denies this allegation, 
and some are calling the allegation a “challenge” of the #MeToo movement.  Id.; Mara 
Liasson, Sexual Assault Allegation Against Joe Biden Presents MeToo Challenge, NPR 
(May 20, 2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/20/859280849/sexual-assault-
allegation-against-joe-biden-presents-metoo-challenge [https://perma.cc/F5KC-WQBD].
Many individuals, including Biden himself, are calling for the release of his records
from his days in the Senate for the purpose of determining whether a complaint from Reade 
exists. Villa & Alter, supra.  These records are not public until two years after the end of
Biden’s public service career and cannot be requested through FOIA as they are from his
position with the Senate, not his time in the Executive Branch. See supra Section II.A.2. 
This perhaps illustrates one shortcoming of FOIA—its scope is decidedly narrow when 
considering all the business conducted by and within the federal government. 
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to violent criminal offenses like rape and assault.163  The #MeToo movement 
illustrated the prominence of sexual misconduct: 81% of women have 
reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment during their 
lifetime.164  Allowing common offenders of sexual harassment to insist on
the confidentiality of his or her victims as a condition of a settlement 
ensures the offender can continue to prey upon victims without knowledge 
of his or her past history of misconduct coming to light.165 
The public has begun to take notice of such settlements and demand 
change. Legislatures in many states have taken steps to disallow organizations 
from confidentially settling sexual misconduct claims at all.166  In the 
#MeToo era,167 new issues related to employers settling claims of sexual
harassment arise quickly.  Legislatures address these common questions, 
163. Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1461–62 (1986). 
164. Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced 
Sexual Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-
sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/TC58-UEYZ].
165. Harvey Weinstein, an entertainment mogul, extensively used non-disclosure
agreements and large settlements with his victims as a tactic to evade accountability for twenty 
years.  See Farrow, supra note 152.  As of 2019, Weinstein is accused of a variety of sexual 
misconduct offenses by ninety-five women.  Tbe Many Women Who Have Accused Harvey 
Weinstein of Sexual Misconduct, YAHOO! ENT. (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.yahoo.com/
entertainment/one-year-later-long-list-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-165106548.html?guc 
counter=1 [https://perma.cc/Y7ZK-USPR]. Weinstein is currently facing charges of two
counts of predatory sexual assault, one count of criminal sexual assault, and two counts of rape 
in New York.  Harvey Weinstein’s Sex-Crimes Charges Streamlined by Judge in Consolidation 
Move, USA TODAY (Sept. 6, 2019, 6:13 PM), https://www.usatoday. com/story/entertainment/
celebrities/2019/09/06/harvey-weinsteins-sex-crime-charges-streamlined-judge/22357 
32001/ [https://perma.cc/BX7Z-87V7].  In many cases, Weinstein accusers have been thwarted
by statutes of limitations.  See id. 
 166. See States Move to Limit Workplace Confidentiality Agreements, CBS NEWS 
(Aug. 27, 2018, 8:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/states-move-to-limit-workplace-
confidentiality-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/Q44A-VQQG].  For a list of those states
having passed, or attempting to pass, legislation disallowing employers to confidentially settle 
sexual harassment claims, see id. 
 167. The #MeToo movement began in October of 2017 and continues today.  #MeToo: 
A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2020, 4:32 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/8TFH-326V]. The 
phrase “Me Too” has historic ties to 2006, when it was used to unite victims of sexual 
violence.  Id.  The movement began when actress Ashley Judd accused Harvey Weinstein 
of sexual misconduct, and gained momentum when actress Alyssa Milano tweeted: “If all 
the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we 
might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.”  Id.; see also Alyssa Milano 
(@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/
status/919659438700670976 (“If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me
too’ as a reply to this tweet.”).  For a comprehensive running timeline of significant events 
in the movement, see #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, supra. 
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echoing concerns of the general public:  Should employers be allowed to
confidentially settle their employee’s sexual harassment claims?  What if 
their contract has an arbitration agreement, and that claim never sees the
light of day in court—and never becomes public knowledge? Should
prominent public figures be allowed to commit sexual misconduct and 
pay the victim large sums of money in return for their silence?  Is this just 
government-endorsed hush money?168 
Social media also plays a critical role in modern sexual misconduct
cases.  In the world of social media, news travels fast—a lesson learned 
the hard way by the Snay family in Gulliver Schools, Inc. v. Snay.169 A 
college-aged daughter’s conduct revoked the settlement award of her 
parents when she commented on her Facebook page: “Mama and Papa 
Snay won the case against Gulliver.  Gulliver is now officially paying for 
my vacation to Europe this summer.  SUCK IT.”170 The court in Gulliver171 
articulated that this was “precisely what the confidentiality agreement was 
designed to prevent,” even though the person who disclosed the information 
publicly was not a party to the litigation.172  Patrick Snay, the father
involved in the settlement, was not permitted to disclose the terms of the 
settlement to his daughter, who ultimately posted the information on 
Facebook.173  Even though the daughter was not a party to the settlement,
her announcement of the settlement frustrated the confidentiality agreed 
to by her parents.174 
Likewise, in the #MeToo era, the news of yet another sexual harassment 
scandal at the hands of a large organization, corporation, or high-profile 
168. MJ Lee, Sunlen Serfaty & Juana Summers, Congress Paid Out $17 Million in 
Settlements. Here’s Why We Know So Little About that Money., CNN POLITICS (Nov. 16, 
2017, 8:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/politics/settlements-congress-sexual-
harassment/index.html [https://perma.cc/4V5K-LKNR]. 
169.  Gulliver Schs., Inc. v. Snay, 137 So. 3d 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
170. On a procedural point, the recession of the settlement agreement was based on
Mr. Snay’s, her father, breach.  Id. at 1046–47.  The daughter was not a party to the lawsuit.  
Id. at 1047.  When Mr. Snay disclosed to his daughter that he settled with Gulliver, he 
breached the confidentiality he held with Gulliver.  Id. at 1046, 1048. 
171. Snay is a breach of contract case; the underlying issue involved a claim by 
plaintiff Snay against defendant Gulliver Schools.  Id. at 1046. Because the initial lawsuit 
between the parties settled, the second lawsuit involved a breach of contract—the settlement 
agreement—and a claim to enforce the provisions of that agreement.  See id. at 1046–47. 
172. Id. at 1047–48. 
173. Id. at 1046–47. 
174. Id.
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individual quickly becomes a news story.175  Victims of sexual misconduct 
are speaking out through participation in awareness events,176 social media 
posts,177 traditional news outlets,178 and numerous other methods of
expression. Given the speed with which news travels, organizations in a 
position to prevent the disclosure of unfavorable information are very 
incentivized to do just that.179 
In response to #MeToo, the State of California passed legislation 
prohibiting confidential settlements in sexual assault, harassment, and 
workplace discrimination cases.180  This law also includes provisions for 
a “failure to prevent” an act of workplace harassment or discrimination 
based on sex, invalidating confidential settlement agreements based on 
claims against employers under negligent employment theories.181  California’s
law accomplishes two things: (1) it prevents defendants from confidentially 
settling claims related to any number of sexual torts, but (2) it also 
prevents plaintiffs with these claims from enjoying the bargaining power 
that comes along with confidentiality.182 California has therefore shifted 
from an individual-plaintiff mentality, to a collective good justification: 
what is good for all plaintiffs is better than what is good for any individual 
plaintiff. A number of other states have joined California in this shift.  
Bills introduced in the legislatures of sixteen states in response to #MeToo 
175. See generally #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, supra note 167. 
176. See, e.g., Lauren Hernandez, Roughly 1,000 March Through Salem for Womxn’s 
March, STATESMAN J. (Jan. 21, 2018, 5:08 PM), https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/ 
news/2018/01/21/salem-womens-march-2018/1042874001/ [https://perma.cc/HUR8-2GDX] 
(publishing a picture of this Comment’s author which appeared on the cover of a Salem, 
Oregon newspaper in the 2018 Womxn’s March, raising her hand to signify that she has 
experienced sexual harassment and identifies with the #MeToo movement). 
177. Monica Anderson & Skye Toor, How Social Media Users Have Discussed 
Sexual Harassment Since #MeToo Went Viral, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/11/how-social-media-users-have-discussed-
sexual-harassment-since-metoo-went-viral/ [https://perma.cc/9BC8-DR9W].
178. See, e.g., Alexandra Jaffee et al., Reade: ‘I Didn’t Use Sexual Harassment’ in 
Biden Complaint, AP NEWS (May 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/aec7beb03e9e0e0
e6e3c58111293e0ea. 
179. See, e.g., Harvey Weinstein Timeline, supra note 160. 
180. See Michael Tener, New Laws Affecting Civil Litigation Practice, SAN JOAQUIN 
CTY. BAR ASS’N (May 18, 2017), https://www.sjcbar.org/attorney-resources/new-laws-
affecting-civil-litigation-practice.html [https://perma.cc/M9GR-SWZ5]. The Code of Civil
Procedure prohibits “a provision within a settlement agreement that prevents the disclosure 
of factual information” when the underlying claim is related to (1) an act of sexual assault, 
(2) an act of sexual harassment, (3) an act of workplace harassment or discrimination based 
on sex, or (4) an act of harassment or discrimination based on sex.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1002 (2020).  This statute was enacted in 2007, but the portion regarding the ban on 
confidential settlements was added in 2017.  See Tener, supra; Assemb. B. 2875, 2006– 
2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). 
181. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001(a)(3) (West 2019). 
182. See Perman, supra note 157. 
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disallow cases of sexual misconduct to confidentially settle.183  However, 
the nation as a whole has declined to follow suit, leaving open many questions 
about who is able to obtain what information when a sexual harassment 
case confidentially settles.184 
C. Two Laws in Conflict
As discussed supra Part II, “Confidential Settlement Agreements,”
many open questions remain as to what information the public is able to 
obtain when a sexual misconduct case settles.  At the state law level, which 
encompasses the vast majority of settlements and contractual non-disclosure 
agreements,185 the enforcement of a confidentiality provision in a sexual
misconduct case is open to a choice of law analysis.  Depending on what 
law the state’s choice of law doctrine requires the state to follow, the 
provisions of the settlement or agreement may be subject to public disclosure, 
or they may remain confidential.186 
183. States Move to Limit Workplace Confidentiality Agreements, CBS NEWS (Aug. 
27, 2018, 8:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/states-move-to-limit-workplace-
confidentiality-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/5F6X-UQDD].
184. For example, will a state that disallows confidential settlements in sexual
harassment cases enforce one from another state?  This analysis involves questions of the 
state’s contractual choice of law doctrine, but as a general principle, it is an open concept.  
A similar question was invoked in Baker v. General Motors Corp., in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously held that a party to a confidential settlement was not barred from 
testifying in a deposition in a different state, even though he or she would be barred from 
doing so in the state that governed the settlement agreement.  522 U.S. 222, 238–41 (1998). 
185. Contracts are usually governed by state statutory law and some general bodies 
of common law.  See Gilkis, supra note 120.  Many common law principles are reflected 
in contract law throughout the United States—such as the various Restatements on Contracts 
or the Uniform Commercial Code—but these principles are dependent upon the individual 
states adopting them.  See id.  Unless the contract is one entered into pursuant to some specific 
federal statute, the contract is based on state law.  See infra note 191 for a discussion of federal 
employment contracts based on federal law. 
186. As a general note, many contracts contain a choice of law clause, requiring that 
a certain state’s law be utilized in interpreting the agreement.  Michael Giusto, Why You 
Need the Right Choice of Law Clause in Your Contract, NEUFELD, O’LEARY & GIUSTO 
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.noglaw.com/need-right-choice-law-clause-contract/ [https://
perma.cc/EZ7B-CYAK].  These provisions aim to prevent uncertainty in how the contract 
will be interpreted should an action on the contract be brought later.  Glenn West, Make 
Sure Your “Choice-of-Law Clause” Chooses All of the Laws of the Chosen Jurisdiction, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/ 
2017/09/18/making-sure-your-choice-of-law-clause-chooses-all-of-the-laws-of-the-
chosen-jurisdiction/ [https://perma.cc/SJ5D-JZED].  Without a choice of law clause, judicial
interpretation of the contract depends on where the action on the contract is brought, and 
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At the federal level, many questions related to the enforceability of sexual 
misconduct settlements remain unanswered.  The federal government declined 
to adopt the trend among the states of enacting legislation to prevent 
confidential settlements of sexual misconduct cases, so these settlements 
remain valid in the federal context.187  Few categories of contracts are
governed by federal law, but several are important: federal government 
employment contracts,188 and contracts involving organizations that 
provide services for the federal government, which are governed by Title 
41 of the U.S. Code, pertaining to Public Contracts.189  Employment
contracts for federal agency employees are governed by various federal 
provisions,190 and are subject to the body of case law created by the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims.191 
These contracts include those of employees and contractors of executive 
agencies.192  When a contractor of an executive agency has a contractual 
dispute, the contractor must submit the dispute to the contracting agency 
prior to taking further action.193  The contractor is then permitted to appeal
to the agency board, or file a de novo action in the Court of Federal 
Claims.194 
what that state’s choice of law doctrine requires. See Giusto, supra. For a primer on the
major choice of law doctrines used by the states, see infra note 220. 
187. However, in response to #MeToo, the federal tax law has rescinded the business 
expense deduction previously available to businesses involved in litigation over certain 
sexual harassment claims.  Jan Frankel Schau, Where Confidentiality and Transparency 
Collide, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2019, at 6, 8, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
dispute_resolution/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/2019/winter-2019-me-too/ 
schau-where-confidentiality-and-transparency-collide/ [https://perma.cc/2BKN-TX7Z].
Now, a business may only claim the deduction if the claim reaches a public resolution—
either through the courts, or through a non-confidential settlement.  Id. at 8–9; see also 
Michelle R. Smith, Some States Place Limits on Secret Harassment Settlements, AP NEWS 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://apnews.com/448968e898554d128c3247e41f7d8d91/Some-states-
place-limits-on-secret-harassment-settlements [https://perma.cc/ZET2-E3DB] (discussing 
various states passing legislation related to #MeToo and the federal response via the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017). 
188. See, e.g., supra note 128 (discussing White House staffers’ contractual agreements).
189. See generally 41 U.S.C. §§ 101–8707. 
190. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 300.104 (2019).  Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
groups employment-related statutes into specific provisions for each agency and Title 20 
codifies federal employee benefits. 
191. See Robert Porter, Contract Claims Against the Federal Government: Sovereign
Immunity and Contractual Remedies 3–4 (Harvard L. Sch. Fed. Budget Pol’y Seminar, 
Briefing Paper No. 22, 2006), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/Contract 
Claims_22.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJY9-2UKU].
192.  Agencies have particular obligations under 41 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1713. 
193.  41 U.S.C. § 7103(a). 
194.  41 U.S.C. § 7104. 
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The nature of confidential settlements means that often, very little is 
known about their prevalence or existence.195  Congressman Gary Palmer
took issue with this situation and proposed legislation requiring federal 
agencies to disclose the amounts of settlements paid for by taxpayer 
dollars.196  The bill also requires that every confidential settlement entered 
into by the federal government be accompanied by a public statement 
explaining the non-disclosure.197  The bill received a unanimous vote
of support in the House of Representatives, but never received a vote in 
the Senate.198 
The current situation is one without any substantial guidance.  The federal 
government’s official position disfavors confidential settlements,199 but
provides no method through which this policy can be enforced: 
It is the policy of the Department of Justice that . . . it will not enter into final
settlement agreements or consent decrees that are subject to confidentiality
provisions, nor will it seek or concur in the sealing of such documents. This policy
flows from the principle of openness in government and is consistent with the
Department’s policies regarding openness in judicial proceedings . . . and the
Freedom of Information Act . . . .200 
195. The Department of Justice maintains that its official position disfavors entering
into confidential settlements on behalf of the United States.  28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2019).  
Doing so, however, is not prohibited—and the Department of Justice indicates that in “rare 
circumstances” such an agreement may be permissible.  § 50.23(b).  The Department nonetheless 
requires the confidentiality provision to be drawn as narrowly as possible, but indicates 
that even without a confidentiality provision, the Department of Justice may not be required to 
disclose the information to the public under the Privacy Act or certain executive orders.  
§ 50.23.  Essentially, the government’s official policy is that it disfavors confidential 
settlements, but the government drafted the language of that decision to give itself 
unfettered discretion in deciding whether or not to follow its own policy.  Id. 
 196. Congressman Palmer’s bill, H.R. 995: Settlement Agreement Information Database
Act of 2019, required that any government agency that enters into a settlement be required 
to report the settlement to compile a searchable database.  Settlement Agreement Information 
Database Act, H.R. 995, 116th Cong. (2019).  Before Congressman Palmer’s bill, only 
those settlements that utilized the “Judgment Fund”—a fund used to pay for settlements 
when an agency lacks funds to pay the settlement out of its own budget—were required to 
be disclosed.  H.R. 995: Settlement Agreement Information Database Act of 2019, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr995/summary [https://perma.cc/3R6L-BJBL]. 
197. Settlement Agreement Information Database Act, H.R. 995, 116th Cong. (2019).
198. H.R. 995: Settlement Agreement Information Database Act of 2019, supra note 
196. 
199.  28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2019). 
200. § 50.23(a). See supra note 195 for a discussion of the government’s current stance
on confidential settlements. 
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Despite the Department of Justice’s official position, Congress has failed 
to enact any substantial check on the agencies’ power to conduct confidential 
business.201  As a result, little is known about how prevalent confidential 
settlements are with the U.S. government.202 
There is also FOIA.  The nature of FOIA exemptions indicates there are
certain elements of a settlement the agencies would not be required to 
disclose anyway, even when presented with an otherwise valid request.203 
Exemptions under category five—related to legally privileged communications 
—can arise in the context of settlement agreements.204  When the  
existence of a settlement is confidential, it necessarily is only available to 
the parties in the litigation and nobody else.205  Therefore, the confidential 
settlement would not be disclosable under FOIA.206 However, when a
settlement is not subject to an exemption or exception, the solution is less 
clear. 
When the confidentiality provisions of a settlement agreement conflict
with FOIA’s general policy of openness, which law prevails?
201. See supra note 196 for a discussion of the failed House Resolution to address the issue
of confidentiality within the agencies. 
202. See H.R. 995: Settlement Agreement Information Database Act of 2019, supra
note 196. 
203. See supra Section II.A.2 for a discussion of the exemptions to FOIA. 
204.  For a discussion of FOIA exemption 5, see supra note 88. 
205. The parties are free to contract for disclosure to no one or to whomever they
wish.  Nondisclosure Agreements: What Are They, and How Do They Work in Sexual Harassment 
Cases?, SPIGGLE LAW FIRM, https://www.spigglelaw.com/employment-blog/nondisclosure-
agreements-work-sexual-harassment-cases/ [https://perma.cc/CVC6-WJFC].  As a result,
non-disclosure agreements come in two forms: mutual agreements, where both parties are 
bound to confidentiality; and one-way agreements, where only one party discloses 
confidential information, and the receiving party is bound to the confidentiality.  Aileene 
Koh, 11 Mistakes that Could Invalidate Your NDA, EVERYNDA (Nov. 16, 2017), https:// 
www.everynda.com/blog/11-ways-invalidate-nda/ [https://perma.cc/N6KH-V5C4]. Generally,
the nature of the non-disclosure agreement depends on the nature of the confidential information 
disclosed.  In a traditional employment context, both parties have disclosed information 
that will remain confidential—the employer’s employment of a sexual tortfeasor or lack 
of policies to protect employees, and the employee’s factual circumstance regarding the 
harassment.  Nondisclosure Agreements: What Are They, and How Do They Work in Sexual 
Harassment Cases?, supra.  This would result in a mutual non-disclosure agreement. In 
many cases, the existence of these settlements is confidential as well.  See Koh, supra. 
206.  This was the initial problem the Detroit Free Press encountered in the Kwame 
Kilpatrick scandal.  The Detroit Free Press knew a settlement must exist based on the facts of 
the case.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the various settlement 
provisions).  However, because of the confidentiality provision and specific exceptions for 
documents used in litigation, the settlement was not discoverable under Michigan’s open 
records law.  See Bunkley, supra note 15. 
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Can the Policies Be Reconciled?—Preliminary 
Choice of Law Questions 
A preliminary question is whether the policy of openness associated
with FOIA, implied from the freedoms of the First Amendment,207 can 
ever be reconciled with the policies of confidentiality and privacy behind 
a confidential settlement agreement. This is not a case where one policy
is a clear moral winner because both policies have accomplished positive 
outcomes for the individuals or groups involved.208  Freedom of information 
is considered a cornerstone to American governance,209 but confidentiality 
is considered essential to good business and fair compensation for injured 
plaintiffs. Neither of these principles necessarily is “better” than the other 
in a moralistic, value judgment sense of the word.210 
The policy of openness in government records is intended to increase 
effective government oversight, something Congress decided was necessary 
and important enough to codify in the laws of the United States.211 
207. FOIA’s initial congressional backer believed the right to freedom of information
was necessarily implied in the rights granted in the First Amendment.  See Lemov & Jones, 
supra note 36, at 14.  Without generally available, public information on which to rely, 
the freedoms of speech and the press have little impact.  Id. 
208.  FOIA aims to “ensure an informed citizenry . . . and [] hold governors accountable 
to the governed.”  FOIA, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/open/foia [https://
perma.cc/SK43-MB5Q] (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 
(1978)).  The purpose of a confidential agreement is to “protect information exchanged” 
between the parties in order to protect business interests or personal privacy.  See What Is 
the Purpose of Confidentiality Agreements?, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/
purpose-of-confidentiality-agreement [https://perma.cc/X8WU-QPRN]. 
209. Stats for Stories: Sunshine Week and Freedom of Information Day, March 15-21 & 
16, 2020, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/
stories/2019/sunshine.html [https://perma.cc/4EEZ-A95N] (quoting How to Get Involved, 
SUNSHINE WK. (Jan. 4, 2017), http://sunshineweek.rcfp.org/how-to-get-involved/ [https:// 
perma.cc/8F49-N2HH]). 
210. A value judgment is a comparison of the “goodness” of a group of things for 
the purpose of determining their subsequent value, or utility, to a person.  See Mark Schroeder, 
Value Theory, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 5, 2008), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
value-theory/ [https://perma.cc/9YTQ-L8NN].  At least one commentator argues that there 
is no way to remove value judgments from judicial decision making, stating that “the 
balancing and weighing that characterize the judicial process cannot be escaped,” and that 
the “occasional value judgment [is] necessary to solve particular problems” in the choice 
of law realm.  Michael Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie’s Restrained and Enlightened 
Forum, 49 CAL. L. REV. 845, 875–76 (1961). 
211. FOIA, supra note 208. 
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Confidentiality in settlement agreements is expressly disfavored in the 
Code of Federal Regulations, but nonetheless, the Department of Justice 
avoids being bound to this opinion.212  Congress has never directly spoken 
on the issue of confidential settlements in this context in a broad sense.213 
The policies in support of a confidential settlement in a sexual misconduct 
case—to protect victims, to encourage economic productivity, to promote 
judicial efficiency, and to give the individual bargaining power against a 
large organization—are all pursuits not addressed by Congress.214 
The path of least resistance in determining a way to work with these
conflicting policies is to see whether they can be reconciled.  If the 
government is faced with a legitimate FOIA request, but that request
would uncover a confidential settlement, an attempt to strike a balance 
between the policies of openness of FOIA and the policies of restricted
access to information of the confidential settlement should be weighed 
212.  28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2019). 
213. Congress has addressed the issue of settlements of harassment claims against 
members of Congress, passing a bill in late 2018 forcing members of Congress to pay out-
of-pocket to settle sexual harassment lawsuits made against them.  See Elise Viebeck, Congress 
Sends Trump Bill to Make Lawmakers Liable for Harassment Settlements, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 13, 2018, 12:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/congress-sends-
trump-bill-to-make-lawmakers-liable-for-harassment-settlements/2018/12/13/cbcdc5fc-
fef6-11e8-83c0-b06139e540e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/NWV9-PYTX].  The Act also
required the settlements be made public.  See id.  Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi indicated 
that this was just the beginning: “We must end the culture of complicity and silence around 
workplace harassment by ensuring that taxpayer money will never again be used for 
settlements, and that members are held personally liable for discrimination in their offices.”  Id.  
President Trump signed the bill in late 2018.  Katherine Tully-McManus & Niels Lesniewski, 
Donald Trump Signs Overhaul of Anti-Harassment Law for Members of Congress, Staff, 
ROLL CALL (Dec. 21, 2018, 9:58 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2018/12/21/donald-
trump-signs-overhaul-of-anti-harassment-law-for-members-of-congress-staff/ [https://perma.cc/
924U-RJDJ].
Congress also included a provision in the 2017 tax reform law intended to discourage 
the use of confidential settlements, but that law simply disallowed federal tax deductions 
for company expenses related to confidential settlements of certain sexual misconduct 
claims. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13307(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2129
(2017); see also Schau, supra note 187, at 8.
214. In contrast to many states, Congress has not passed any piece of legislation
banning confidential settlements in workplace sexual misconduct cases.  See Lee, Serfaty 
& Summers, supra note 168.  Congress did, eventually, pass a bill regulating how 
sexual misconduct settlements are paid for when they involve a claim against a member 
of Congress.  Kelsey Snell, Congress to Make Members Pay Out of Pocket for Sexual Harassment 
Settlements, NPR (Dec. 12, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/12/676209258/ 
congress-to-make-members-pay-out-of-pocket-for-sexual-harassment-settlements [https://
perma.cc/KRG8-UQR5]. The previous system allowed payment of such settlements out 
of a general fund set up by the U.S. Treasury, and individual lawmakers were not responsible
for paying costs out of their own budget.  See Lee, Serfaty & Summers, supra note 168. 
In 2018, Congress passed a bill making individual lawmakers responsible for these costs. 
Snell, supra. 
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and addressed carefully.215 However, the resolution is not so simple. 
Confidentiality and openness are inherently polar opposite concepts, and 
when an agency is expected to make the determination as to which 
prevails, doing so is no more than a value judgment by the agency.216 
Choice of law analysis provides a helpful framework for agencies making 
these determinations when two competing policies are at play.
This is not a traditional choice of law question.217  Traditional choice of
law questions deal with two different jurisdictions having conflicting laws 
and the issues with which law applies.218  Traditional choice of law questions
do not address what to do when two conflicting laws on opposite ends of 
the same spectrum exist in conflict.  However, an analysis through choice 
of law doctrines provides a useful framework for addressing the underlying 
issue: which law is superior when both laws seem well-supported.219 
1. Choice of Law Frameworks 
Many choice of law frameworks exist in American jurisprudence.220 
The traditional approach is jurisdictional-specific, and applies the law of 
215.  For a discussion weighing these competing policies, see Traynor, supra note 
210, at 875–76 (arguing that such comparisons are inherent in all judicial decision making). 
216. See Schroeder, supra note 210.
217. Traditional choice of law questions involve a forum, usually a state, determining
which substantive and procedural law to apply to a certain dispute.  Max Rheinstein, Ulrich 




219. In situations involving a state-law based contract—the more common type of
contract—and a federal FOIA request, the federal law would, at least in theory, preempt 
the state law under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  However, 
finding a state contract that would be responsive to a FOIA request may be a large hurdle 
in this specific kind of case—FOIA only applies to the federal executive branch, so locating a 
contract entered into by the federal executive that is governed by state law is a bit of an 
issue itself.  See About FOIA and Other Information Access Programs, U.S. DEP’T ST., https:// 
foia.state.gov/learn/ [https://perma.cc/G4CM-D7CK].  The issue this Comment addresses 
involves a question of a federal contract—governed by Title 41 of the U.S. Code.  This 
makes the issue one outside of the scope of federal preemption, as FOIA is a federal statute, 
as are the U.S. Code provisions that govern federal contract formation. 
220. For a brief analysis of the main choice of law approaches, see Approaches to 
Choice of Law, US LEGAL, https://civilprocedure.uslegal.com/choice-of-law/approaches-
to-choice-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/3JU5-ZD25].
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the state in which the “right[] ‘vested.’”221  This vested rights theory 
emphasizes approaching the problem from the time of the injury, and 
applies the law, as it existed at the time of the injury, from the jurisdiction 
in which the injury took place.222  This approach is of minimal use in shedding 
light on a non-jurisdictional, non-time dependent issue.  The Second 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws approaches choice of law analysis 
slightly differently and applies the law of the forum with the “most 
significant relationship” to the injury and the parties.223  This analysis
promotes “protecting the expectations of the parties” and emphasizes “the 
values of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result” achieved 
when applying the law the parties anticipated would apply, based on the 
significance of that law to the parties.224  This approach, emphasizing the
protection of the parties’ expectations, does not prove particularly helpful 
when determining which law to apply between two laws that are heavily 
relied upon by different parties, like FOIA and confidential settlements.225 
221. Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191,
1194–95 (1987) (first citing JOSEPH H. BEALE, 1 A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1–2 
(1935); then citing ALBERT V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE 
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1–2 (2d ed. 1908)) (analyzing the First Restatement’s Vested 
Rights Theory). 
222. Id. at 1195. The underlying point of the Vested Rights Theory is that the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred has the greatest connection to the injury, such that 
applying its law to the injury makes the most logical sense.  Id.  Vested Rights Theory takes 
this one step further and applies the law of that jurisdiction as it existed at the time of the 
injury.  Id. 
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1969). 
224. Id. § 188 cmt.(b). 
225. Many Americans rely on FOIA as a source of information for Executive Branch 
activities.  As of Fiscal Year 2018, more FOIA requesters are seeking information about 
themselves from executive agencies than any other topic, overtaking journalists as the 
number one category of requesters.  See Amelia Brust, 2018 Sees Record Number of FOIA 
Requests, Information Seekers Change, FED. NEWS NETWORK (June 7, 2019, 5:17 PM), 
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/open-datatransparency/2019/06/2018-sees-record-
number-of-foia-requests-information-seekers-change/ [https://perma.cc/3MHH-M4BK].
The personal interest in information ranges from requesters seeking their own immigration 
documents or documentation to obtain veterans’ benefits all the way to individuals seeking 
genealogical research from the National Archives.  See id. 
Confidential settlements are also widely used as an end to litigation.  Confidential settlement
agreements induce reliance by committing one, or both, parties to an agreement of secrecy 
on certain topics of the agreement. See Kelley & Edwards, supra note 148, at 1–3.  Employers 
particularly rely on the confidentiality when settling disputes with employees, as the
employee’s sworn confidentiality on the issue essentially ensures no other employees can
use the settlement information to bring another, similar lawsuit against the company. Id.
In the #MeToo context, this allows misconduct to continue with new victims.  See id.
250
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2. Government Interest Analysis, Comparative Impairment,
and the Restrained Approach 
The most valuable choice of law analysis shedding light on the conflict 
between confidentiality and FOIA is comparative impairment analysis, a 
version of the government interest analysis approach.226  Comparative
impairment analysis evaluates the policies underlying each of the conflicting 
laws, and applies the law that will be most impaired if that law is not 
applied.227  This necessarily implies that different jurisdictions have
different interests in having their own law applied to a particular set of 
facts, and that these interests are more or less important than the interests 
of the other jurisdictions.228  This determination is made by analyzing
which law’s policy interests will be more frustrated if that law does not 
apply in the given situation.229  This approach can provide valuable insight
into any situation where two laws conflict and have differing policies, 
such as the conflict between confidentiality in settlement agreements and 
FOIA. 
Choice of law analysis, including the comparative impairment approach,
provides a useful framework to choose one law in a given situation when 
multiple laws could theoretically apply, and the results differ depending 
on which law is used.  Courts often struggle to determine which jurisdiction’s
law applies in a case where different jurisdictions have different interests
in having their own law applied, and the outcome of the case would be 
226. See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years 
After Currie: An End and a Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847.  Symeonides’s article 
discusses Currie’s conception of government interest analysis as a doctrine, as well as the 
popularity of the doctrine since Currie developed it in the 1950s and 1960s.  See id. at 
1890–91. 
227. See id. at 1864–65. 
228. See generally id. at 1850–67 (discussing the use of Currie’s government interest 
analysis approach).
229. This final, and not often utilized, step is referred to as an independent body of
choice of law doctrine called “comparative impairment.”  See id. at 1864–65.  Some 
jurisdictions choose to include comparative impairment in their use of government interest 
analysis, whereas others pick and choose different elements of the doctrine to incorporate 
into their own choice of law doctrines.  See id. at 1889.  This leads to major inconsistencies 
between the different states in the ways they apply purportedly the same choice of law 
doctrine, with some commentators arguing that utilizing comparative impairment is 
contrary to the “doctrinal purity” of government interest analysis.  Herma Hill Kay, The Use of 
Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 
68 CAL. L. REV. 577, 578 (1980). 
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different depending on the law used.230  Although different states use different 
approaches to this “choice of law” question,231 comparative impairment 
focuses on the policies behind the law, not the effect on the individual 
case, to determine which law should prevail.  Comparative impairment requires
the court to ask three questions to determine the outcome: 
(1) Do the laws differ substantively, such that the outcome
under each law would be different? 
(2) Does each jurisdiction have an interest in having its law 
applied? If only one jurisdiction has a legitimate interest 
in having its law applied, that law will naturally apply, 
and the analysis can end. 
(3) Which jurisdiction’s interest will be more “impaired” if 
its law is not applied?232 
The analysis is approached differently among the states using government 
interest analysis; only some states incorporate the final question—the 
comparative impairment element—to their analysis.233  Additionally, some
courts attempt to find a way that both competing policies in a choice of 
law analysis can coexist, allowing a more flexible rule that does not require 
one state’s law to apply to every similar situation as a bright–line rule.234 
This approach focuses on finding a way to bridge the gap between the 
competing policies in order to allow them to exist side by side without a 
conflict.235 This “restrained method” of government interest analysis focuses
on harmonizing two seemingly different ideas, allowing the court to step 
away from the role of making a value judgment regarding the moral rightness 
230. See Government Interests Approach, US LEGAL, https://conflictoflaws.uslegal.com/
laws-applicable-to-torts/government-interests-approach/ [https://perma.cc/EVA3-NNDY].
231. See supra Section III.A. 
232. Government Interests Approach, supra note 230.  The final subpart is accomplished
through “comparative impairment” analysis.  For a discussion about comparative impairment 
and its role in government interest analysis, see Kay, supra note 229, at 578.  For an example 
of a case decided using this approach, and the subsequent analysis of the method in that 
case, see generally Case Note, Conflict of Laws—Choice of Law—Governmental Interest 
Test Applied to Hold Tavern Owner Liable Under Local Law—Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 
1976 BYU L. REV. 953, 953. 
 233. See generally Kay, supra note 229, at 577. 
234. This approach may have been Currie’s goal all along.  One commentator argues
that Currie “urged” that, in cases where there was an apparent true conflict—when both 
states with an interest in applying their own laws had differing laws—the state should 
“reexamine the content of its own [] laws” and provide its law a “restrained and moderate 
interpretation” in an effort to avoid a true conflict.  Leo Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment 
and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 256 (1978) 
(discussing Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
754 (1963)).
235. See id. at 258. 
252
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of one law over the other, and into the role of a mediator, to find common 
ground for each policy interest.236 
This Comment advocates for the restrained approach to government 
interest analysis, but regardless of what the specific form of the analysis looks 
like, the analyzing court must look to the policies underlying each law 
to determine whether the laws can exist in harmony or if one law must 
necessarily be applied over the other.237 When two laws appear to be in 
conflict, government interest analysis requires the deciding court to identify 
the “focal point” in support of each law.238  In analyzing these policy interests,
courts are permitted to look at legislative history and case law interpretations 
of the law in question.239  Courts that take the restrained approach must give
the law a “restrained and moderate interpretation” with the ultimate goal 
of avoiding a true conflict.240 
If a court using the restrained approach cannot avoid a true conflict, it 
uses comparative impairment to determine which jurisdiction’s interest 
will be “more impaired” should its law not apply.241  Impairment is essentially
a shorthand phrase for identifying which jurisdiction has a stronger focal 
point policy in support of its own law.  The procedural elements of government 
interest analysis intend to safeguard the process against value judgments 
by the courts, but these judgments nonetheless sneak their way into the 
analysis at this stage.242 
236. See generally Schroeder, supra note 210, and Traynor, supra note 210, for a 
discussion of value judgments and their role in judicial decision making.  Whether value 
theory has a place in the judicial process is open to debate. 
237. See generally Kanowitz, supra note 234. 
238. Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 221 (1958). 
239. Lea Brilmayer, Government Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 
46 OHIO ST. L. REV. 459, 462–63 (1985) (arguing that utilizing methods of statutory 
interpretation in government interest analysis undermines the legitimacy of the doctrine). 
240. See Kanowitz, supra note 234, at 256. 
241. Government Interests Approach, supra note 230. 
242. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 239 (offering one commentator’s argument 
that government interest analysis is too flexible as a doctrine, essentially allowing the court 
to come to whatever decision they wish, and to use the doctrine retroactively to support 
that decision). 
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B. Freedom of Information Act Policies Prevail When Applying 
Government Interest Analysis 
Utilizing the government interest analysis approach requires first 
determining if the outcome under each law would be different if that law
was applied. If the answer is yes, the analysis considers whether there is
an important policy justification behind applying either law.  If important
policies exist behind each law, the analysis continues to the comparative
impairment question—asking which policy would be “more impaired” if 
that law were not to apply.  If one policy would be “more impaired” if that 
law was not applied, the court should use that law.243 
The threshold question of all varieties of government interest analysis 
is whether the outcome would actually be different under each law as 
stated. In the case of a confidential settlement in conflict with FOIA, the 
clear answer is yes.  When a confidential settlement agreement with a 
government agency is disclosable under FOIA,244 but the confidentiality 
provision prevents certain information from disclosure, the outcome of 
the FOIA request will differ depending on whether the agency decides to 
comply with FOIA or with the confidentiality requirement of the settlement.  
As previously noted, the Obama Administration admitted that one-third 
of its withheld FOIA responses had no proper legal basis for the failure to 
disclose.245  This illustrates the broad discretion with which agencies and 
243. Government Interests Approach, supra note 230.
244. This situation only applies when no valid FOIA exemption is invoked.  If there 
is a legitimate, statutory reason for refusing to grant a FOIA request, no laws are in 
conflict—the FOIA statute already provided for an exemption in that particular context.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (5).  The most likely exemption invoked by a confidential settlement 
would be exemption five for privileged inter-agency communications.  § 552(b)(5).  Exemption 
three, which applies to information that is prohibited from disclosure by another federal 
law, may be invoked but the government’s basis for this claim is weak, § 552(b)(3): while 
confidential settlements with the federal government are technically allowed, the Department 
of Justice has indicated that its official position “disfavors” such settlements, and that only 
in “rare circumstances” such an agreement is permissible.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2019).  
If the government chose to withhold a confidential settlement based on exemption three, 
it would potentially face litigation on the issue related to whether the “rare circumstances” 
requirement applies.  See id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).  See supra note 195 for a 
discussion on the government’s view on confidential settlements. 
245. See Bridis, supra note 93 (discussing the Obama-era policies regarding FOIA, 
and the Administration’s inability to abide by their own policies).  This creates a potential 
problem for FOIA requesters, especially when considering the analysis of exemption three.  
See supra note 244 and accompanying text.  The government must meet the high standard 
of showing that the confidential settlement was one of the “rare circumstances” where the 
government permits such an agreement, but the individual requester has zero oversight 
into the government’s decision-making on that issue.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.23 (2019).  Further, 
knowing that one-third of withheld FOIA requests had no proper legal basis for the failure 
to disclose, see Bridis, supra note 93, significantly undermines the government’s credibility in 
responding to valid FOIA requests, and all but assures confidential settlements can be 
254
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Administrations are able to handle FOIA requests, including the discretion 
to choose to withhold certain records on less-than-solid legal footing.246 
As a result, a probable outcome is that FOIA requests will be denied if 
they uncover a confidential settlement, regardless of whether such settlement 
is legally enforceable, or such settlement actually falls within a certain 
exemption or exception to FOIA.247  If the agencies strictly adhered to 
FOIA, the outcome may differ. 
Next, the analysis shifts to whether each jurisdiction—or in this case,
the basis of each law—has a legitimate interest in that law’s application.248 
This framework addresses the policy in support of each law.  Again, courts
are permitted to look at the regular instruments of statutory interpretation—
legislative history and case law interpretations—in identifying each law’s 
focal point.249 With the current conflict, it must be assumed that the FOIA 
request was sufficiently narrow, and that no FOIA exemptions or exceptions 
apply.250 
The following sections analyze legislative history and case law interpretations 
to identify the focal point of each law.
withheld without giving the requester an opportunity to bring a legitimate opposition, even
if there is no legitimate legal basis for withholding the settlement in the first place. 
246. See Bridis, supra note 93. 
247. This outcome is likely.  The agencies responding to FOIA requests are equipped 
to do so and are knowledgeable about the FOIA disclosure process and the various exemptions 
and exceptions.  See Jory Heckman, Why a FOIA Workforce Shortage? Employees May 
See Work as ‘Punishment,’ FED. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:45 AM), https://federal 
newsnetwork.com/open-datatransparency/2018/10/why-a-foia-workforce-shortage-
employees-may-see-work-as-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/FL9N-E4GP]. As a result, an 
agency employee tasked with responding to FOIA requests encountering a confidential 
settlement agreement may be in an unfamiliar situation and may reasonably believe that 
the confidentiality always precludes disclosure.  Employees assigned to handle FOIA 
processing often see this work as a form of punishment, and may be inexperienced, or not 
take the process seriously.  See id.  For a discussion of potential FOIA exemptions that 
may be invoked by a confidential settlement agreement, see supra note 244. 
248. Government Interests Approach, supra note 230. 
249. See Lauren Mattiuzzo, Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation, HEINONLINE 
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2018), https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2018/03/legislative-intent-and-
statutory-interpretation/ [https://perma.cc/BN2J-8YJJ].
250. See id. If a FOIA exemption or exception were to apply, no conflict analysis
would be necessary—FOIA’s exemptions and exceptions are statutory provisions that 
prevent the release of information, so when this law encounters a confidential settlement, 
the laws accomplish the same goal.  See id. 
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1. Policy Behind the Freedom of Information Act
FOIA was passed under the view that the right to free, unfettered access 
to information was implied in the First Amendment right to free speech.251 
Congressman Moss began his long-fought battle to enact FOIA out of
disdain for the House “Un-American Activities Committee” tasked with
“investigating” suspicious groups alleged to be front organizations for the 
Communist Party.252  The information used to convict members of these
groups, and fire them from their government employment, was generally 
hearsay evidence compiled by the FBI.253  It was this environment of secrecy
that led Congressman Moss to champion FOIA and follow a twelve-year 
path to attain its enactment.254 
Taking a broad approach at what constitutes “legislative history,” the
concept behind FOIA may have developed centuries prior to Congressman
Moss’s enactment campaign.  James Madison is considered the “philosophical
founder” of FOIA and stated that “knowledge will forever govern ignorance” 
in his warnings against the perils of becoming “a popular government, 
without popular information.”255  Madison’s warning conjured up imagery
of an uninformed electorate, believing that without freedom of information, 
the electorate would be unable to perform its most basic and essential 
task—electing officials.  The need for information for the purpose of informing 
the electorate is the theoretical concept at the core of FOIA.256  FOIA and
subsequent amendments responded to concerns of government misdealing, 
believing such incidents could be prevented, or at the very least voted out 
of office, given a broad availability of information to the public.257  In
terms of broad values, the core purposes of FOIA are openness, accessible 
information for the electorate, and knowledge. 
As far as the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue, the basic philosophy 
behind FOIA is “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.”258  Courts
generally enter FOIA analysis after a FOIA request was denied and 
251. See Lemov & Jones, supra note 36, at 14.
252.  See id. at 3. 
 253. Id.
 254. Id. at 4. 
255. See FOIA Post: Celebrating James Madison and the Freedom of Information Act,
supra note 70. 
256. Id.
 257. See Lemov & Jones, supra note 36, at 2–4 (discussing the political climate during 
FOIA’s passage, and the public’s concerns about the government’s attempts to oust any 
communist from federal government employment). 
258. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360–61 (1976) (quoting S. REP.
NO.89-813, at 3 (1965)) (regarding the legislative history in passing FOIA)). 
256
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that denial is challenged in the courts.259  Thus, the courts’ role is often in
interpreting the exemptions and exceptions to FOIA, and the justifications 
in support of those, rather than the justifications of FOIA as a whole.260 
When courts do interpret FOIA as a whole act, they have interpreted the 
act’s philosophy as “disclosure,” indicating that a core value of FOIA is 
open accessibility to agency information.261 
Because of the complexities of FOIA and its long-term philosophical 
background, analyzing each and every potential source of both legislative 
and judicial interpretation on FOIA would be nearly, if not actually, 
impossible.  The trends, discussed supra Part II, “Policy Behind the Freedom 
of Information Act,” indicate that the ascertained goals of FOIA are 
values of openness, knowledge, and fairness, all implied from the First 
Amendment; and the ability of an electorate to make informed decisions 
in selecting representatives.262  This echoes Madison’s concerns about
popular governance requiring popular information, foreshadowing a 
problematic situation in which an electorate relies on alternative facts.263 
Taking a restrained view of FOIA’s policies, it becomes evident that 
FOIA is not actually as broad as its philosophical founder may have 
desired.264  FOIA involves numerous exemptions and exceptions, which
curtail the government’s responsibility to disclose valid information sought 
by the public.265 Therefore, FOIA does still stand for the above-articulated
policies of openness, transparency, and creating and informed electorate 
—but does not have an absolutist approach in doing so.  FOIA allows for 
259. See, e.g., id. at 354–55; see also 43 C.F.R. § 2.57 (2016) (highlighting the statutory 
rules governing the appeals process, which must be exhausted prior to entering the court 
system). 
260. Rose, 425 U.S. at 360 (interpreting the internal personnel rules exemption to FOIA).
261. Id.
262. See Lemov & Jones, supra note 36, at 14. 
263. See generally S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the
Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137 (2017) (discussing post-truth politics and potential 
remedies for misinformation among the electorate). 
264. Founding Father James Madison seemed to champion a broad interpretation of
freedom of information, arguing that without free knowledge, the people would be governed 
by ignorance. See Doyle, supra note 68. However, at least one commentator believes 
Madison did not actually practice open government of the sort he argued was necessary for 
effective governance.  See Paul Rosenzweig, Transparency, Within Reason, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(Mar. 14, 2005), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/commentary/transparency-
within-reason [https://perma.cc/TA4R-9A6M].  Because Madison was involved in the Constitutional
Convention, of which secrecy was an essential component, perhaps his approach to 
transparency was not absolute.  See id. 
265. See supra note 244 and accompanying text. 
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many kinds of information to be shielded from disclosure, all of which
could potentially sway voters or work to enhance transparency.  FOIA 
essentially plays a balancing game by weighing its broad philosophical 
goals against the practical necessity of secrecy in conducting government 
operations. However, the exemptions and exceptions are to be narrowly 
construed266 and generally only apply to limited areas.  The “restrained”
FOIA view is that of government openness, but qualified to allow certain 
areas of information to be withheld, contrary to the policy of openness. 
2. Policy Behind Confidential Settlements 
The interests behind confidentiality include the freedom to contract and 
ability to increase bargaining ability of plaintiffs.267 Confidentiality 
increases bargaining power for plaintiffs, as confidentiality incentivizes 
certain defendants to settle when the defendant cares less about the financials 
and more about the potential public relations fallout from a lawsuit.268 
This trend is prominent in products liability cases,269 but also has implications 
in areas of sexual misconduct.270  For a government agency looking to settle 
a claim that a manager sexually harassed employees, confidentiality offers 
some limited reassurance that no other plaintiffs will bring a similar suit, 
as they may be entirely unaware they have the ability or resources to do 
so.  Confidentiality further provides an element of enhanced job security 
for an official within the government that may be compelled to resign—
or have to face an angry constituency in re-election— in the face of known 
harassment claims.271 
266.  U.S. Dep’t. of Just. v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988). 
267. See generally Perman, supra note 157 (discussing on the use of confidentiality 
as a bargaining tool for plaintiffs in sexual misconduct cases). 
268. Id.
269. The State of California recently tried to ban such confidential settlements, but 
the measure died in the State Assembly.  See Two Bills from 2017 Die on the Vine, CAL. 
NEWS PUBLISHERS ASS’N (Feb. 2, 2018), https://cnpa.com/two-bills-from-2017-die-on-
the-vine/ [https://perma.cc/BT2S-KPLV]. The proposed bill, which essentially mirrored 
California’s ban on confidential settlements in sexual misconduct cases, would also prevent 
product manufacturers from confidentially settling any claim that was “a danger to the 
public health or safety.”  Assemb. B. 889, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
270. See Perman, supra note 157. 
271. See Lee, Serfaty & Summers, supra note 168. This article discusses how little 
the general public actually knows about confidential settlements of sexual misconduct claims 
involving members of Congress, and how the funding for such settlements previously 
came from taxpayer dollars.  Id.  Because the settlements were allowed to remain confidential, 
taxpayers—and thus, voters—were not made aware that their representatives were spending 
large sums of public funds on settling their personal sexual misconduct allegations. Id.  
Whether this would have caused voters to not vote for that representative again is an open 
question—and one the 2016 election complicated further, as 46% of voters voted for 
Donald Trump, see An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, Based on Validated Voters, 
258
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The contractual nature of a confidential settlement has policy implications 
in contract law.  The freedom to contract is cherished in American governance 
as a way to create an entirely custom body of private law for a particular 
transaction or relationship.272  So long as the provisions of the agreement 
are not contrary to public policy or otherwise subject to a limitation, a contract 
will likely be enforced.273  The ability to contract for confidentiality in 
settlements is a concept of autonomy.274  The parties have a freedom to 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.people-press.org/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-
the-2016-electorate-based-on-validated-voters [https://perma.cc/96XF-EX4G], despite the
public release of audio recordings of Trump claiming his star power allowed him to “grab 
‘em by the pussy,” Mark Makela, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About 
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-
trump-tape-transcript.html [https://perma.cc/BPC5-SHLH]. This data suggests that even
when a public official is faced with legitimate claims of sexual misconduct, the electorate 
may still cast a vote in favor of that candidate.  See An Examination of the 2016 Electorate, 
Based on Validated Voters, supra; Makela, supra; ; see also Eli Yokley, Bloomberg Loses 
Ground Following Debate Debut in Las Vegas, MORNING CONSULT (Feb. 21, 2020, 2:34 
PM), https://morningconsult.com/2020/02/21/michael-bloomberg-polling-post-debate-las-vegas
[https://perma.cc/G9X5-5DTY] (discussing Michael Bloomberg’s 17% share of first-choice
voters and third place spot among all 2020 Democratic candidates, despite public concern 
about his treatment of women in the workplace); supra note 32 and accompanying text 
(discussing Michael Bloomberg’s troubled candidacy). 
272. See Gilkis, supra note 120. 
273. See Unenforceable Contracts: What to Watch Out for, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/ 
legal-encyclopedia/unenforceable-contracts-tips-33079.html [https://perma.cc/9BEL-YZZV].
This is not the only material limitation on contracting.  Contracts can be invalidated for 
many reasons, including issues with the form of the contract, issues with fraud in procuring
the contract, and so forth.  See, e.g., Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 58 (1945). 
The public policy limitation ensures that no contract that is contrary to “the laws and legal 
precedents” of the governing jurisdiction will be valid. Id. at 66 (citing Vidal v. Mayor of
Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127, 197–98 (1844)) (analyzing whether a contract to purchase land 
from the federal government was invalid as a matter of public policy). Muschany holds that the
public policy must be articulated in actual laws or legal precedent, and that “general
considerations of proposed public interest” are insufficient to establish a public policy for 
contractual invalidation purposes.  Id. (citing Vidal, 43 U.S. at 197–98). 
274. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No state shall enter into . . . any Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).  This autonomy is not absolute.  The Constitution generally 
prohibits states from impairing the right to freely contract, but has held certain intrusions 
into this freedom appropriate—for example, contracts that restrict wages of women 
workers were found to be a valid use of the states’ police powers, see West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386, 389 (1937); the ability to extend the redemption period 
on a mortgage entering foreclosure was found not to violate the Contract Clause, as the 
measure was temporary, see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444–
48 (1934); and contracts found to violate public policy are considered invalid, see, e.g., 
Neiman v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
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choose whatever contractual provisions they wish, so long as those choices 
are fair and within the scope of good public policy.275 
Taking a restrained view of the policies behind confidential settlements 
requires looking at the specific settlements entered into by the federal
government.  A common government contract is for labor, whether via 
traditional employment or through independent government contractors.276 
In this context, the government has interests in having a freedom to contract 
—government contracts are generally awarded after a bidding process, 
necessarily requiring a freedom on both the part of the government and 
the contractor to establish terms and rates of pay.277  However, when litigation 
arises in the employment context, the government’s freedom to contract 
involves different priorities.  For example, the government may wish to 
keep specific trade secrets confidential, especially when dealing with technical 
contractors;278 but in the case of a sexual misconduct claim, the government’s
freedom to contract does not cleanly encompass any legitimate government 
concern. The government may wish to act like a corporation with a public
relations strategy to confidentially settle sexual misconduct claims, but 
government officials, unlike corporate entities, are subject to public oversight 
in the form of reelection or FOIA.  By becoming a public employee, 
individuals have already given up their ability to have their affairs remain 
wholly confidential, so extending a freedom to contract for confidentiality 
in a settlement makes minimal sense in this narrow view.279 
275. Neiman, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. 
276. Certain safeguards exist within the Code of Federal Regulations for the selection of
contractors, in which contractors must meet certain employment requirements.  Generally 
speaking, the internal workings of a government contractor are not subject to FOIA, as it 
is not an “agency” under the scope of FOIA; however, different procedural devices for 
oversight exist.  See 41 C.F.R. § 50-201.3 (2019) (inclusive of the general regulations 
placed on government contractors); 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.8 (defining “harassment and hostile 
work environments” pursuant to Exec. Order No. 11246 (1965), which established anti-
discrimination policies for hiring and employment on the part of government contractors). 
277. See How to Become a Federal Government Contractor, USA.GOV, https:// 
www.usa.gov/become-government-contractor [https://perma.cc/R32T-DSZV] (discussing
interactive tools related to the demand and pricing of specific services for government
contracts).
278. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (providing criminal penalties for individuals who disclose trade
secrets or related material). 
279. Whether or not this restriction on public employees’ ability to keep information 
private is a positive or negative is not a straightforward question.  For example, when Tamir 
Rice, a twelve-year-old African American child was shot by police in 2014, the officer’s 
personnel records were obtained through a state open records request.  Caroline Cournoyer, 
How Much Privacy Do Public Employees Actually Have?, GOVERNING (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/workforce/gov-government-public-employee-privacy.html 
[https://perma.cc/AG37-R5XU]. Those records contained information from the officer’s 
previous employer, citing his “inability to perform basic functions” and a “dangerous loss 
of composure” when handling firearms.  Id.  Despite public outrage, the officer was cleared 
260
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Taking the restrained view of the policies behind confidentiality, the 
policies encourage fair bargaining for plaintiffs, allow for autonomy
via freedom to contract, and allow the government, as a party to a contract,
to prevent sensitive information from becoming public.  However, this 
restrained view affords no place for confidentiality in sexual misconduct 
settlements, as the public officials involved already committed to public 
oversight into their affairs.
3. The Restrained Approach 
The policies in support of FOIA and confidential settlements must be 
afforded a “restrained” interpretation, with the ultimate goal of allowing 
the laws to coexist and avoiding a “true conflict.”280  To do so, the policies 
of each law that can work in agreement must be identified.281 
The freedom to contract is not substantially limited by requiring confidential 
settlements to be disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request.  The freedom to
contract is not already without its limitations; imposing another limitation
does not substantially reduce the effectiveness or legitimacy of the freedom.282 
of wrongdoing in the incident and hired by a different police department thereafter.  Id.; 
Matthew Haag, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Is Hired by an Ohio Police 
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/08/us/timothy-
loehmann-tamir-rice-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/87S6-HGRP].
On the other hand, activist groups are using open records acts to gain information about 
university researchers and using this information in an attempt to stop certain areas of scientific 
development.  Activist groups have targeted research into pollution, gun violence, climate 
change, genetically modified foods, and the connections between mining and cancer, 
among others.  Puneet Kollipara, Open Records Laws Becoming Vehicle for Harassing Academic 
Researchers, Report Warns, SCI. (Feb. 13, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/ 
news/2015/02/open-records-laws-becoming-vehicle-harassing-academic-researchers-
report-warns [https://perma.cc/Z9EV-WUMJ].  By seeking the scientists’ emails, handwritten 
notes, and research strategies, the effect has been to chill the researchers’ free speech rights 
and prevent scientific development altogether.  Id.  Because the scientists are at government- 
funded universities, their activities are subject to open records laws.  Id. 
In both the case of Tamir Rice and the scientific researchers, no elected officials were 
involved. These are the stories of regular, non-elected public employees, dealing with increased 
public awareness of their professional lives simply because they exist in a framework that
allows anyone to request records pertaining to their work. See id. All government employees, 
including elected and unelected officials, necessarily open themselves up to this kind of
oversight.
280. Kanowitz, supra note 234, at 256 (citing Currie, supra note 234, at 757). 
281. Id.
 282. See generally Mark Pettit, Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the “Rise 
and Fall,” 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 265–67 (1999) (discussing the various restraints on
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Further, imposing an additional limitation is not even necessary under the 
restrained approach—requiring a confidential settlement to be disclosed 
under FOIA would make sense within the public policy limitation on the 
freedom to contract. Because the Department of Justice has already taken 
a stance disfavoring confidential settlements of federal government claims 
and therefore articulated public policy in this area, requiring confidential 
settlements to be disclosed under FOIA is a natural extension of the public 
policy limitation on contracting.283  In taking this restrained approach, the
freedom to contract and openness policies can coexist, and the goal of the 
restrained approach is met.284 
In a situation where the confidential settlement was concealing information 
already exempted under FOIA—for example, the settlement contained 
trade secrets or inter-agency communications—no conflict exists and the 
information would not be disclosed.285  This necessitates a case-by-case 
analysis of the content of the settlement and FOIA request when the 
information contained may be responsive to a FOIA exemption.286  If the
settlement contains only exempted material, no detriment is done to the 
policies in support of FOIA by withholding that information; nor is any 
detriment done to the confidentiality of the settlement agreement, because 
the information was not disclosed. This is a “false conflict.”287 
the freedom to contract and the emergence of these restraints over time).  Pettit argues that 
limitations on the freedom to contract are limitations on the concept of freedom itself, but 
concludes that “[i]f there is a direct conflict between freedom of contract and some other 
clearly articulated value, even some that might not seem particularly significant, freedom 
of contract often loses.” Id. at 354.  Despite Pettit articulating the freedom to contract as 
a “fundamental” right, he indicates that this freedom is easily taken away. Id. at 353–54. 
283. 28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2019).  See supra note 195 and accompanying text for
a discussion regarding the government’s “official position” on confidential settlements as 
articulated in 28 C.F.R. § 50.23.  The government has not created a strict policy to adhere 
to this position. 
284. See Kanowitz, supra note 234, at 256 (citing Currie, supra note 234, at 758). 
285. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9); see also supra note 244 (discussing FOIA’s statutory 
exemptions).  This situation does not create a “true conflict” as discussed by Professor
Currie’s methodology.  See Kanowitz, supra note 234 (citing Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s 
Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, U. Chi. L. Rev. 227, 251 (1958)).  Instead, 
this situation involves two laws actually working together—FOIA’s exemption for the 
relevant material, and the confidentiality provision of the agreement.  The analysis in this 
Section regarding the restrained approach to this particular scenario shows the need to 
evaluate the merits of each FOIA request independently.  See generally id. 
286. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing how the outcome would 
not be classified as a “true conflict” and thus a case-by-case analysis is necessary for all 
FOIA requests).
287. See Symeonides, supra note 226, at 1862–63 (discussing Professor Currie’s 
“False Conflicts” doctrine and establishing the false conflict situation as one in which only 
one state has a legitimate interest in having its law applied). 
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In the case of confidential settlement of an employment-context sexual 
misconduct case, the confidentiality provision of the settlement is already 
disfavored by many states and the federal government. This is shown by 
the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’s refusal to allow a tax deduction for 
employers’ litigation expenses arising out of a sexual misconduct claim 
that ultimately ends in a confidential settlement.288  Additionally, the
Department of Justice disfavors all confidential settlements involving the 
federal government.289  Both of these policies make it difficult to consider
a confidential settlement as anything but “contrary to public policy,”290 
and an assumption should be made that when a valid FOIA request seeks
a confidential settlement agreement, the agreement is contrary to public
policy.291 
At their very core, the concepts behind FOIA and the ability to confidentially 
settle a sexual tort dispute are at odds and create, at the very least, an 
“apparent conflict” under this analysis.292  The apparent conflict exists
when it appears that each law has a legitimate policy interest in its application 
in the given situation.293  However, categorizing the laws as having a “true
conflict” can be avoided by giving the laws a restrained interpretation.  
When analyzing the policies side by side, it becomes apparent that, at least 
in the context of a sexual misconduct settlement, the laws can coincide.294 
288. Schau, supra note 187, at 8. 
289.  See 28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2019). 
290. Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 50, 66 (1945) (discussing that the
public policy must be articulated in actual laws or legal precedent, and that “general considerations 
of proposed public interest” are insufficient).  As the government’s official position is articulated 
in the Code of Federal Regulations, this qualifies as public policy under Muschany, despite 
the government not always following its own mandate.  See Jason Clayworth, 10 Top 
Iowa Officials Signed Secret Settlements with State Workers, DES MOINES REG. (Mar. 
25, 2014, 11:45 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/ investigations/2014/03/
26/10-top-iowa-officials-signed-secret-settlements-with-state-workers/6900285/ [https://perma.
cc/V2KZ-59FH] (discussing twenty-four uncovered secret settlements from the Iowan
government that contained confidentiality clauses, some of which involved two assistants 
of the Iowa attorney general’s office).  If the government did not wish to take the position 
articulated in 28 C.F.R § 50.23 as its official policy regarding confidential settlements, the
government should have refrained from articulating such a position in the “actual laws” as 
defined by Muschany.  324 U.S. at 66. 
291. See Muschany, 324 U.S. at 50, 66. 
292. Government Interests Approach, supra note 230; see also Symeonides, supra
note 226, at 1850–67 (discussing the historical use of the general governmental interest 
analysis framework). 
293. Government Interests Approach, supra note 230. 
294. See Kanowitz, supra note 234, at 256. 
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Because confidential settlements, especially those of sexual misconduct 
claims, are generally disfavored by the states and the federal government, 
these settlements are contrary to public policy and not enforceable when 
sought by a FOIA request.295  However, when the settlement contains 
information that would otherwise be shielded from disclosure under FOIA,296 
whether through an exception or exemption, the confidentiality of that 
agreement may remain without eroding the reach of FOIA.297 
C. Can the Policies Be Reconciled? 
Despite appearing as polar opposites, the restrained approach of government 
interest analysis allows the policies behind FOIA and confidential settlements 
to coexist in the situation of a FOIA request that would uncover an 
otherwise-confidential settlement.  Because all confidential settlements 
are disfavored by the federal government in 28 C.F.R. § 50.23, they are 
considered contrary to public policy.298  However, there is no law directly
forbidding such settlements at the federal level, so the government is free 
to continue to contract for confidential settlements despite the official policy 
disfavoring these settlements.  Within the FOIA context, a FOIA request 
has strong policies in favor of openness and disclosure, which coexist with 
the policy against confidential settlements articulated in 28 C.F.R. § 50.23.  
As a result, information regarding the confidential settlement must be 
disclosed unless subject to an exemption or exception.  Of note, FOIA has 
already been limited in certain discrete ways through exemptions and 
exceptions—none of which specifically exempt disclosure of the information 
sought by a FOIA request uncovering a confidential sexual misconduct 
settlement.299  If an exemption or exception applies, the policy of openness
behind FOIA would no longer be a relevant consideration, and the information 
would not be disclosed as there is no true conflict.300 
Absent an applicable exemption or exception, a confidential settlement
agreement in a sexual misconduct case must be disclosed pursuant to a FOIA
295. See Muschany, 324 U.S. at 64–69. 
296. Information not required to be disclosed under FOIA is found in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b)(1)–(9) and discussed herein supra Section II.A.2. 
 297. See supra note 285 (discussing the “false conflict” situation). 
298. See Muschany, 324 U.S. at 64–69; see also supra note 290 and accompanying 
text (discussing the government’s position articulated in 28 C.F.R. § 50.23, disfavoring 
confidential settlements, as meeting Muschany’s requirement that the public policy be 
articulated in “actual laws” in order for it to qualify as an invalidation on a contract). 
299. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text for FOIA’s exemptions and
exceptions. 
300. See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing the “false conflict” that 
arises when the policies behind two laws appear to be different, but actually accomplish the 
same goal). 
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request because the restrained approach is able to align the government’s 
official position against confidential settlements with the policy of openness 
in FOIA.
IV. CONCLUSION
Kwame Kilpatrick would still be behind bars if the open records request 
that uncovered his salacious affair was not granted, but only because he 
would go on to commit several white-collar crimes, landing him a substantial 
prison sentence.301  Had the Detroit Free Press been denied Kilpatrick’s
settlement information, the City of Detroit would have never learned the 
information used to remove their corrupt mayor from office—including 
that he lied to the city council in gaining approval of the confidential 
settlement in the first place.302  Kilpatrick may have stayed in office, even
after his egregious cover-up of a murder and affair with his chief of staff, 
if the Detroit Free Press had not unraveled the settlement information 
from a knot of confidentiality.303 
The strong policies behind FOIA emphasize the need for openness and 
transparency to help create an informed electorate.304  The policies behind 
confidentiality in settlements are likewise strong, emphasizing freedom to 
contract and autonomy, and allowing plaintiffs greater settlement bargaining 
power when faced with a large institutional defendant who wishes to keep 
a claim quiet.305  When using government interest analysis, the threshold
question is whether the two policies can actually coexist side-by-side, 
resulting in the same outcome regardless of which law is applied.306  When
taking the traditional government interest analysis approach, it becomes 
apparent that these policies are polar opposites—the secrecy of the settlement 
necessarily opposes the openness of FOIA—but in taking a restrained 
301. Robert Snell, Former Detroit Mayor Loses Latest Bid for Freedom, DETROIT 
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2019, 11:12 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/detroit-
city/2019/11/15/former-detroit-mayor-kwame-kilpatrick-loses-latest-bid-freedom/42014 
72002/ [https://perma.cc/B6CP-5FTF].
302. See Zappala, supra note 22, at 30. 
303. See id.
 304. See supra Section II.A.3 (analyzing the history behind FOIA and the legislative 
intent in its passage, as well as its modern usage). 
305. See Section III.B.2 (analyzing common usage and contractual reliance theories 
of confidential settlement agreements). 
306. See sources cited supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the government 
interest analysis framework, including the preliminary questions to be asked when utilizing the 
framework). 
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approach, the competing policies can be reconciled.307  The federal government
has articulated a policy, codified in the Code of Federal Regulations,308 
opposing confidential settlements in any claim involving the government. 
Because this position satisfies the definition of “public policy,”309 the
restrained view indicates that a confidential settlement is contrary to the 
public policy of the United States and should be disclosed under FOIA. 
Kilpatrick was a public official who gave up a great deal of his ability 
to confidentially conduct business when he submitted to the public’s 
oversight.310  Michigan’s open records act, an analog to the federal FOIA, 
has a policy promoting openness, but not an absolute policy—despite having 
exemptions and exceptions, the drafters of the statute did not provide for 
this type of information to be withheld.311  Because the justification for 
the confidentiality of the settlement was necessarily eroded by the conduct 
of Kilpatrick, and the open records request involved information that was 
otherwise disclosable, the policies behind the laws are not truly in conflict 
under a restrained interpretation. Michigan rightfully granted the request 
after the Detroit Free Press pursued the issue.312  The same cannot be said
for every case at the federal level, with a recent Administration admitting 
to improperly withholding one-third of its FOIA responses with no legal 
basis for doing so.313 
The Kilpatrick story and surrounding use of open records laws reflects 
a broader issue at the federal level.  Individuals in the United States use 
the federal government’s policy of transparency as a way to supervise the
government and ensure it acts in the best interest of the people.314 
However, when the opportunity exists for a high-level federal official to 
confidentially settle sexual misconduct claims and insulate that claim 
from public oversight, the official is incentivized to do just that in order 
to keep his or her official position.315  The Kilpatrick scandal illustrates
the extent to which a government official is capable of withholding information 
307. See supra Section III.B.3 (holding that the policies can be reconciled when using
the restrained approach of government interest analysis). 
308.  28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2019). 
309. Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945) (holding that a public policy
must be articulated in actual laws or legal precedent, and that “general considerations of proposed 
public interest” are insufficient to establish a public policy for contractual invalidation purposes). 
310. See sources cited supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
311. Michigan Freedom of Information Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 15.231, 15.243 
(1976).
312. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
313. Bridis, supra note 93. 
314. See supra Section II.A.3 (analyzing the history behind FOIA and the legislative 
intent in its passage, as well as its modern usage). 
315. See Burdge, supra note 151 (discussing the incentive of large organizational
defendants to confidentially settle claims when they believe stand-by plaintiffs may exist). 
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that may be relevant to a voter, pursuant to the legal channels of a confidential 
settlement. Given the policies of openness and transparency, articulated 
by the federal government in the Code of Federal Regulations,316 this practice
can no longer be maintained. 
Information matters.317  Forty-seven percent of Americans believe it is 
difficult to know whether the information they encounter is true.318  Americans
are also shutting the doors on confidentiality—it took until 2017 for 
America to start the difficult conversation about what to do when a person 
in power causes pain to hundreds of women and pays them hush money 
in the form of a settlement agreement.319  Realizing that they could have 
protected other similarly situated individuals, many victims broke their 
non-disclosure agreements, seeking justice from the courts in the process.320 
America is shifting how it views confidentiality, and how it views information 
—FOIA requests increase year after year, and yet are still often denied 
without a legal basis for doing so.321  The cultural shift to demand transparency,
legitimate oversight, and fairness and equality for employees is rooted in 
a community-based mindset that all people should look out for the best 
interests of others. One initial step to accomplishing this goal is allowing 
public access to information about misconduct occurring at the federal 
level. 
316.  28 C.F.R. § 50.23(a) (2019). 
317. See Ariel Edwards-Levy, Young Voters Don’t Feel Well-Informed. Some Think 
That Means They Shouldn’t Vote., HUFFPOST (Oct. 18, 2018, 8:03 PM), https://www.huff 
post.com/entry/young-voters-not-informed-midterm-elections_n_5bc90345e4b0d38b587
661b4 [https://perma.cc/K5JL-995W].
318. Sabrina Tavernise & Aidan Gardiner, ‘No One Believes Anything’: Voters Worn 
Out by a Fog of Political News, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2019, 12:42 PM), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/11/18/us/polls-media-fake-news.html [https://perma.cc/7NXX-TGC6]. 
319. See Harvey Weinstein Timeline, supra note 160.
 320. See, e.g., Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on 
Sexual Harassment Claims, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/
1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589 [https://perma.cc/RGE9-MC59].
321. Bridis, supra note 93. 
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